My Research Paper: 'A Place in the Sun': The Effect of Great Power Psychology on German Weltpolitik in the Wilhelmine Era

The reason for the lack of posts in the past two months is because I have been burdened with my first research paper in three years. But it's now done. For the curious, here is what I've been laboring on for the last couple of months. It concerns the effect of Great Power psychology on German foreign policy before World War I.


'A Place in the Sun': The Effect of Great Power Psychology on German Weltpolitik in the Wilhelmine Era

From 1815 until 1914 something truly remarkable occurred or rather didn't occur, namely, for a century there was no general European war. Now, obviously there were various conflicts that took place during this period, most notably the Italian and German wars of unification, but many of these were localized incidents involving two, at most three powers. What is meant by the above statement is that there was never a conflict that developed into a wider European war during this period.¹ This was indeed a unique development given the history of European international relations prior to the 19^th century. The Concert of Europe that had formed out of the Congress of Vienna (the peace settlement that definitively ended the Napoleonic wars) astoundingly maintained peace for a hundred years.² It took the outbreak of the First World War to finally put an end to this peace, effectively shattering European civilization in the process.

And precisely because this war was so world-shattering the desire to apportion “blame” to one or more of its participants emerged quickly after the war's end. There thus arose a pervasive dogmatism in the subsequent study of the causes of the First World War which in certain respects still plagues this popular area of historical inquiry. In this respect, the passionate desire of historians to ascertain the causes of the Great War has had no rival within the sub-field of international history that has traditionally concerned itself with the study of the origins of conflicts.³ In the years since the war there has been a proliferation of reasons cited as the primary cause ranging from the sensible (incendiary Balkans problem, rise of Anglo-German antagonism, great power war mobilization plans, etc) to the less probable (secret treaties, entangling alliances, domestic problems), to the conspiratorial (manipulation of the international system by Jewish financiers).⁴

But in spite of these differences there has been a general tendency to emphasize the role of Empire as being a contributing factor in causing World War I because of the part the imperial system played in the breakdown of the balance of power system in Europe that had generally been maintained since Vienna.⁵ It was with good reason that the historian Eric Hobsbawm entitled the second part of his classic trilogy The Age of Empire for it is an accurate description of the several decades preceding the war.⁶ This period witnessed the infamous “scramble for Africa”, the penetration and exploitation of China, the height of the “Great Game” between Russia and Great Britain, and more. In fact between the brief period of 1860 and 1914 the great powers amassed more colonies than in any of the previous centuries combined since the 16^th century.⁷

The belated participant in this “Age of Empire” was most notably Germany which had only relatively recently in terms of European history become a nation in 1871 under the great Prussian statesman Otto von Bismark. And except for a brief period (1884-1885) Germany under the direction of Chancellor Bismark mostly refrained from the imperial dash then being made by the other powers because in Bismark’s words the new German nation was “a satiated power.”⁸ But the accession of Wihelm II to the position of new German Kaiser in 1888 changed this. After forcing Bismark’s resignation over a domestic dispute, Wilhelm began to exercise more control over Germany’s foreign policy, eventually ushering in the so-called “New Course” (1890-1896) and Weltpolitik⁹ (world policy; 1897-1914) eras.¹⁰ Germany, Kaiser Wihelm asserted, deserved “a place in the sun”¹¹ with the other great European powers.¹² This meant among other things a renewed focus on the acquisition of colonies, the buildup of a major naval force, the right to arbitration in international disputes, and a general acknowledgment of Germany's status as a Great Power.

But besides the drive for obvious concrete imperial aims the primary motivation underlying Germany's determined pursuit of Weltpolitik was at bottom psychological. In fact, I would argue that at this period in history being an imperial power from the perspective of a belated country such as Germany was a function of “Great Power Psychology”. That is, to be a Great Power was to have an empire; to have an empire was to be a Great Power. Thus, Germany's imperial desires were more about the non-tangible aspects of being a Great Power and less about the actual finite gains to be had from acquiring and maintaining an Empire. In other words having an Empire functioned as a kind of status symbol that indicated one was in fact a Great Power.

Now of course there clearly were economic incentives driving much of Germany's foreign actions and adventures during the Wilhemine period; I do not deny such. Indeed Germany's fated geographic position as a central European power necessitated a certain degree of expansion if it wished to continue to rise as an economic force on the continent of Europe. My point is one of emphasis: the course that German Weltpolitik was to endeavor upon was more about power prestige and status as a Great Power and less about the physical gains to be had from, say, the possession of colonies or the build up of a great navy.

Now, anyone who has engaged in even a cursory study of the origins of the First World War knows that German Weltpolitik and its relation, if any, to the cause of World War I has been treated ad naseum. But the focus has tended to be on German aims of the more traditional, that is to say, physical elements of Empire and how such a reckless pursuit of these goals created a hostile environment between the other major powers vis a vis Germany. The purpose of this paper is not to call this standard interpretation into question but rather to isolate the psychological aspect of Empire that involves Great Power status and to show how this in turn informed and shaped the course of German foreign policy in the decades before the Great War. To draw this out necessitates examining German foreign policy during this time period in three specific though related areas that were briefly mentioned above, namely, the desire for colonies, a naval force, and the right to arbitration and/or consultation in international disputes. ¹³

We turn first to the most obvious marker of Empire and Great Power status: the possession of colonies.

The German Colonial Bid

The Franco-Prussian war was truly a watershed moment in the history of Germany. Its conclusion brought about the unification of the various German states (save Austria) principally under the direction of the “Iron and Blood” statesman Otto von Bismark who became the German chancellor in the Spring of 1871. ¹⁴ While the Age of Empire was just beginning Bismark was busy consolidating the new position of the second German Reich and so initially refused to have anything to do with the most recent surge in colonial activity then being conducted by the other European powers, repeatedly declaring on more than one occasion, “I am no man of colonies.”¹⁵ Moreover, in a famous incident Bismark purportedly told a German explorer of Africa, “Here is Russia and here is France, with Germany in the middle. That is my map of Africa.”¹⁶

But for reasons that remain somewhat obscure Bismark altered course and the first colonies obtained by Germany in the years 1884-1885 were done so under his approval.¹⁷ These were the Cameroons in west central Africa, a strip of territory in German south-west Africa, and a northern portion of New Guinea. There were a few other minor colonial gains made during this period but eventually Bismark soured on the whole enterprise and reverted back to an anti-colonial policy. It would take Bismark's dismissal and the rise to prominence of Kaiser Wilhelm II to renew a German push for colonies. As noted before these changes occurred in 1890. Oddly enough, however, Germany's renewed bid for colonial territory began rather benignly, namely, with the signing of an agreement with England that gave to Germany a small North Sea archipelago called Heligoland in exchange for some previously disputed territory in East Africa (Zanzibar).¹⁸ But this proved to be the high point of Anglo-German relations during this so called “New Course” period because for various reasons that we will return to later Anglo-German relations deteriorated rapidly thereafter, leading to a pronounced antagonism between the two powers that would last until the outbreak of world war.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Germany continued to acquire territories, especially in South East Asia, in these first few years of undisputed Wilhelmine rule.²⁰ Most notably was the seizure in 1897²¹ of the Chinese port Kiao-Chow, ostensibly in response to the murder of two German missionaries in the Shantung province.²²

In the remaining years from 1900-1914 Germany continued to make small grabs in Asia and Africa; the last remaining portions of Africa that Germany received came about because of an international crisis over Morocco (which will be examined in more detail later) and as the result of the outcome of Anglo-German negotiations over the status of Portuguese colonies in Africa.²³

On paper Germany's colonial possessions appeared impressive, but in reality none of the acquired territory, with the possible exception of the Heligoland, were of any real economic or strategic value. This fact is partly supported by the general ease with which the powers, especially Great Britain, made colonial concessions to Germany over this time period. In short by the time Germany thrust itself upon the colonial scene the pickings were slim. What one high official in the German office exclaimed upon learning of the possession of Samoa that “it was not worth the money spent upon telegrams to and from Apia”²⁴ could be said of the entire German colonial venture upon the eve of World War I. Indeed much of the hostility that Germany's colonial policy was to create was due to the fact that Wilhem and the German foreign office understood that if they were to obtain any territory of actual value they would most likely have to do so in a manner that could only be perceived by the other powers as aggressive. But Germany pressed on all the same.

Clearly then there was more to German colonial aims than simply the physical acquisition of territory for economic and/or strategic gain. Great Power psychology provides the explantion. Germany sought to emulate the other Great Powers and understood that a strong marker of Great Power status was the possession of colonies. If the second Reich was to truly take its place as great power then the control of foreign lands was a sine qua non. Therefore, Great Power psychology compelled Germany to seize foreign lands, regardless of their value. So Hobsbawm: “Once the status of a great power thus became associated with raising its flag over some palm-fringed beach...the acquisition of colonies itself became a status symbol, irrespective of their value.”²⁵

But of course to have colonies requires the building and maintaining of some kind of navy and so it is to Germany's naval ambitions that we now turn.

German Naval Policy

Wilhelm's vital role in the formation of a powerful German navy cannot be overstated. The Kaiser harbored a personal fascination for navies originating with his childhood when he used to look upon the British Royal Navy fleet with awe and reverence.²⁶ His own personal passion for navies “was the customary blend of absurdity and energetic enthusiasm” often exhibited for example by Wilhelm's donning of an admiral's uniform in public, his obsession with learning the technical details of British Royal Navy ships, and his repeated readings of Alfred Thayer Mahan's influential maritime study The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.²⁷ Thus as Germany rose in power it was no accident that Wilhelm decided the country needed a strong navy. Furthermore, this navy was to be the instrument, or perhaps more correctly, the enforcer of Wilhemine Weltpolitik.

The most important decision Wilhelm was to make on this score was the appointment in 1897 of Rear Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to the position of State Secretary for the Imperial Navy Office.²⁸ Through shrewd political maneuvering Tirpitz successfully was able to pass in the Reichstag the Navy Law of 1898 and a supplement to that law in 1900, a moment in German history nearly on par with that of unification.²⁹ Why? Because as the historian Jonathan Steinberg notes “the Navy Law of 1898 was no ordinary piece of military legislation. It began a new era. The emphasis in German military affairs shifted dramatically from the land to the sea.”³⁰ The Law itself increased the size of the current German naval fleet by seven battle ships, two heavy cruisers, and seven light cruisers.³¹ The modern German battle fleet had been birthed.

This newly created German battle fleet found an immediate use during the 1902-03 Venezuelan Affair when as part of an Anglo-German blockade that was meant to pressure Venezuela into settling its debts with foreign creditors the German Navy recklessly bombarded a port in the country to the angry outcry of the United States.³² But the United States weren't the only ones to be alarmed by the existence and actions of this new component of Weltpolitik.

For centuries a central tenet of British foreign policy had been the preservation of British Royal Naval supremacy in the seas based first of course on security for the Homeland because of its geographical handicap as an island nation and second as an instrument of protection for its widely flung colonies.³³ Therefore, any perceived attempt to change or challenge British naval supremacy would immediately be construed as a threat by Great Britain. And so not surprisingly Great Britain began to interpret German naval development in such a fashion.³⁴ This resulted in a naval arms race between the two powers with the result that by 1912 England came out just slightly ahead in the number of its Dreadnought class battle ships versus similar German versions.³⁵ This naval arms race between England and Germany did more to create hostility between the two powers than did any other factor before the First World War.³⁶

Surely Germany knew that their Flottenpolitik or naval policies would antagonize the British? Most definitely. In fact, the Navy Law of 1898 was from the very beginning designed as a measure against England in that it was intended to challenge Great Britain's traditional mastery of the seas.³⁷

So what then explains Germany's apparently heedless Flottenpolitik? That there were clearly economic interests which influenced the desire for the development of a strong German navy cannot be denied.³⁸ By the mid 1890's Germany's industry and trade were at an all time high, and so an interpretation which concludes that Germany desired a navy in particular to safe guard these new gains and other economic interests such as their recently acquired colonies is a reasonable one. But even here Great Power psychology provides an explanation for the reckless naval actions of Germany after 1897.

It is impossible to convey in this short paper the impact that Alfred Thayer's Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History had on the nations at the time of its publication in 1890.³⁹ I have already mentioned the profound spell it cast upon Wilhelm. But the book's influence penetrated Tirpitz as well who had 2,000 copies of the book translated into German and distributed as part of his political campaign for the passage of the Reichstag Navy Law.⁴⁰ The central message that figures like Wilhelm, Tirpitz, and others took from Mahan's book was this: to be a Great Power was to have a great navy.

This belief in a necessary linkage between Great Power status and naval dominance influenced the naval policies of German Weltpolitik more than economic forces when you consider two things (1) what came to be the German navy was primarily composed of battle ships which is important because if the drive to build a navy was born out of a need solely to protect commercial interests then the focus would have been on the building of primarily fast cruisers and (2) as mentioned above Germany's Navy Laws were designed specifically to challenge Great Britain's mastery over the seas which again makes no sense if purely economic motives were the main cause in Germany's desire for a great navy. Therefore, just as in the case of its pursuit of colonies, likewise the creation of a great navy was for Germany an effect of the Great Power psychology that pervaded the international system at this period in history. Steinberg perhaps conveys this better when he states that, “the gunboat and the battle fleet joined the more traditional devices of diplomacy, and the possession of a presentable fleet became the hall-mark of international respectability.”⁴¹

But in addition to having colonies and a great navy being an imperial power was also about the right to engage in international disputes and crises, the next and last category to be examined.

German Right to Inclusion on the International Stage: The Moroccan Crises

One of the first instances of Germany flexing its Weltpolitik on the world scene was the Venezuelan Affair of 1902-03 that I have already briefly mentioned. But this incident had the result of really only antagonizing one power, namely, the United States, since it was seen by Washington as a blatant violation of its Monroe Doctrine.⁴² Moreover, it was an affair that was smoothed over quite rapidly with no lasting repercussions on the international community and therefore was soon forgotten.⁴³ The same cannot be said for the two Moroccan crises that were to follow.⁴⁴

In late March of 1905 on the pretext of settling certain grievances that the German government supposedly had with Morocco, Kaiser Wilhelm landed his personal cruiser in the port of Tangier thus precipitating the first Moroccan crisis.⁴⁵ In reality, then Chancellor Bulow convinced the Kaiser to land in Morocco because Germany had learned of secret talks between France and Great Britain concerning Moroccan issues that had remained latent for some time.⁴⁶ These talks were rightly viewed by Germany as a violation of the 1880 Madrid Convention which stated that any future issues arising in regards to the “Moroccan Question” must be consulted with all of the participants of that accord which had included Germany.⁴⁷

Early in the crisis, Germany earned a diplomatic victory with the forced resignation of French foreign minister Declasse⁴⁸, but Germany soon botched this success by, first, refusing to negotiate directly with the French, instead calling for a general conference to discuss the “Moroccan Question”⁴⁹, and then, second, by failing to develop any clear goals that it wished to achieve out of the crisis.⁵⁰ The result was that Germany came off looking the aggressor because as the historian John Lowe aptly states the other European powers saw clearly that German actions “had every intention of making a drama out of a crisis.”⁵¹ And so at the Algeciras Conference of 1906 only Morocco and Austria-Hungary backed the German government.⁵² The Germans were left with a vague promise of protection of their commercial rights while the French position and influence in Morocco was actually enhanced.⁵³ It was a humiliating defeat for Germany.

In the intervening years between this first Moroccan crisis and the next, Germany and France made some attempts at a modus vivendi, eventually resulting in the Franco-German Accord of 1909 in which Germany recognized France's special political interests in Morocco in return for more economic rights in the country.⁵⁴ But the “Moroccan Question” was soon hurled back onto the world stage when an uprising against the Sultan provided France with an opportunity to occupy the capital of Fez under the pretext of protecting French nationals. The German response was rapid: the new foreign secretary Kiderlen-Waechter ordered a ship to land at the southern port of Agadir on July 1 of 1911; the famous so called “Panther's leap to Agadir”. ⁵⁵ The second Moroccan crisis was thus ignited.⁵⁶

Initially, the second Moroccan crisis played out in similar fashion to the first with the other powers generally at first sympathetic to Germany's grievance against France's violation of their 1909 accord. But under Foreign Minister Kiderlen's direction German moves soon became hostile and after a week the German government was demanding colonial concessions from France, particularly in the vaguely defined “Congo” region.⁵⁷ These demands coupled with Germany's continued intransigence over the negotiations outraged the other powers, especially Great Britain who by this point had definitively cast off its 19^th century isolationist disposition.⁵⁸

The first Moroccan crisis and the naval arms race had done much to antagonize Great Britain so that by the time it was clear that Germany was once again the aggressor in the second Moroccan crisis, Great Britain firmly gave its support to the French throughout the affair.⁵⁹ The result was yet another conference in which Germany was forced to significantly moderate its claims against the staunch united opposition of the other powers, coming away with only a small sliver of French Congolese territory.⁶⁰ France on the other hand was finally given their long sought after protectorate over the country, the very thing Germany had been trying to prevent since even before the first Moroccan crisis. And so once again Germany was faced with a national humiliation.

The Moroccan crises were to have a profound effect on the climate of international relations, probably more so than did Germany's sometimes aggressive pursuit of colonies or its reckless naval arms race with Great Britain. Though speaking specifically in reference to the consequences of the first Moroccan crisis, Anderson's comments that the actions of Germany “reverberated like the distant rumblings of canon” across the whole of Europe applies just as appropriately to both crises.

There are usually two explanations given for the actions of the German government in both of the Moroccan crises: (1) Germany aimed at a disruption of the Anglo-French entente⁶¹, and (2) Germany thought it could leverage itself to acquire more colonial territory. The latter explanation has the least explanatory power since during the first Moroccan crisis there were never any colonial demands put forward by Germany.⁶² And though during the second crisis Germany did demand colonial concessions ultimately securing a small portion of central African territory, it is far from clear that this was the primary motive behind Kiderlen's actions. That this was apparently the case seems borne out by the fact that there was a full week between the “Panther's leap at Agadir” and Kiderlen's first demand for some kind of colonial compensation.⁶³ Furthermore, even when a demand was finally made it took some time before any definable desired colonial territory was put forth.⁶⁴ Thus, I suspect that Kiderlen only knew that he had to come out of this crisis with some kind of tangible gain so as to avoid a repeat of the first Moroccan crisis, but that he did not at first have a clear notion of what form this demand would take, hence his preliminary explanation for the seizing of Agadir as a “clenched pledge” for an undefined future compensation of some sort.⁶⁵

However, the first explanation, namely, that Germany was attempting to split the Anglo-French entente has considerable merit. This entente combined with (1) the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 that “settled” the grievances between Russia and England over their “Great Game” in central and eastern Asia, and (2) the continued deterioration of Russo-German relations, chiefly over the festering Balkans problem, led to a growing feeling of “encirclement” in Germany.⁶⁶ Thus it is quite reasonable that Germany would try to alleviate this problem by attempting to break up the various ententes by whatever means, short of war, it believed necessary.⁶⁷

Therefore, while there is some truth to the above explanations regarding German actions in these crises, the best explanation for German motives nevertheless remains the simpler one: Germany acted as it did because of Great Power psychology. This is clear when you consider that what sparked both affairs was French refusal to acknowledge Germany's right to partake in the larger “Moroccan Question.” Still, Germany's conduct was “only superficially about Morocco.”⁶⁸ The greater crime from Germany's perspective was its belief that the French refusal to recognize its commercial rights in Morocco was really a refusal to acknowledge its status as a great power with the right to inclusion in international affairs. In other words, Germany objected and acted for reasons of prestige.⁶⁹ To simplify further, French actions appeared to indicate to Germany that France did not recognize it as a Great Power.

 
And so Germany thrust itself into the ports of Tangier and Agadir because of a perceived diminution of its Great Power status. Additionally, that Germany's underlying motive was psychological is further indicated by the feckless way it conducted its diplomacy thereafter, only in the latter crisis eventually formulating a concrete demand. In both crises Germany wanted some way to humiliate France but “could find no operational expression for that objective.”⁷⁰ Indeed, once Germany had dramatically acted it didn't have much of an inkling of what it hoped to achieve from the crises except a recognition of some kind that it was Great Power worthy to be consulted in international matters. Therefore, just as with the pursuit of colonies and the building of a great navy, German action in both of the Moroccan crises was ultimately motivated by Great Power psychology.⁷¹ .

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to show how in three specific but interconnected areas of German Weltpolitik, namely, colonial aims, naval ambitions, and the right to a role in international affairs was driven by the Great Power mindset that had come to saturate the international scene in this “Age of Empire”. However, again, this is not to deny the role of other factors, especially economic and domestic ones, that was surely a component in the development of German Weltpolitik. The analysis used here has been chiefly one in line with a macro study of history. Thus, there has resulted an inevitable tendency towards simplification in this paper that could not be avoided. So I want to stress that German Weltpolitik was a much more complex phenomenon than the impression that has been given here.

Nonetheless, this examination of Germany's approach to three common features generally associated with an imperial power during this time period indicate how the psychological drive to acquire Great Power status and prestige underlay the actions of German Weltpolitik. While at times other impersonal forces may have slightly altered German foreign policy it was the compulsory, almost atavistic desire to imitate the other Great Powers that kept German Weltpolitik on what would turn out to be a crash course.

Germany because it entered into the Age of Empire so late was like a kid trying to mature too quickly because it badly wanted to be like the grown ups surrounding it. The trouble was that except for under Bismark, Germany never developed a wise and mature foreign policy with which to engage the other Great Powers.⁷² Beyond the superficial Great Power status symbols discussed above in this paper German Weltpolitik never acquired any other concrete aims. And because of this German diplomacy, even when it had no bearing on the three aspects of Empire discussed here, often came across to the other powers as curt and abrasive. The result was that German foreign policy gained a European reputation for being motivated by a “dangerous irrationality.”⁷³ And so not surprisingly Germany's foreign policy increasingly became viewed by the others as uniformly aggressive, a factor which definitely contributed to the outbreak of world war in 1914.

To sum up, once Germany had set itself on the path of becoming a Great Power it was only natural that it would develop a desire for “a place in the sun.” Yet unfortunately as the late diplomatic historian A.J.P. Taylor notes, “by this they meant someone else's place in the sun, their own having become too hot.”⁷⁴

1The Crimean War (1854-56) is sometimes cited as an exception but aside from a few battles on the Crimean peninsula this war was chiefly a naval one.

2Hence Henry Kissinger's appropriately named study, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). I should note that the Concert of Europe actually broke up with the Crimean War. Bismark's European system would eventually take over this role. Therefore, it is actually more accurate to say that the Concert of Europe and the Bismarkian Order maintained a general peace for nearly a hundred of years in Europe.

3The possible exception being the study of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) that resulted in the unification of Germany. However, I would argue that the dogmatism that has surrounded this discussion is itself directly related to the question of Germany's role in causing World War I since it is often argued that if Germany had never become united it likely would not have gone on to become the key power to disrupt the European balance of power system. For a helpful discussion of these issues see further The Unification of Germany 1848-1871, ed. Otto Pflanze (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1968), especially 69-80; also see David Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismark, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001).

4The controversial nature of this topic typically arises from the question of German war guilt as supposedly originating from the so called “war guilt” clause of the Treaty of Versailles (the document itself does not actually use this phrase). This question then took on a new dimension after the demise of Nazi Germany with post-war scholarship increasingly concerning itself with issue of continuity in German history. The publication of Fritz Fischer's controversial Germany's War Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967) significantly intensified the debate. For a helpful survey consult Niall Ferguson, “Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives in The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No.3 (Sep., 1992), 725-52; and Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus(London: Longman, 2002), particularly 127-74 for the impact and controversy concerning the Fischer thesis.

5The connection between imperialism and World War I is as old as the war itself having been famously put forth by Lenin while the war was still raging and some would say having been anticipated by J.A. Hobson's classic work Imperialism: A Study (London: Nisbit and Co. Limited, 1902; reprint 2010). See further William L. Langer, “A Critique of Imperialism” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 14, No. 1 (Oct., 1935), 102-19, for a concise though somewhat dated examination of Hobson's study.

6The Age of Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).

7Hobson, Imperialism, 15-29.

8As quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, Bismark: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage Publishing, 1967), 129.

9For a detailed examination of Weltpolitik, see C.M. Andrew, “Weltpolitik and the Reshaping of the Duel Alliance”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.1 (1966).

10 For the sake of precision I should state that though Wilhelm did indeed exert a significant degree of control over Germany's foreign policy he was not its sole mover since both the foreign minister (and later Chancellor) Bulow and State Secretary Holstein were factors, though limited ones, in determining the direction that German Weltpoltik was to take, especially after 1900. See William Young, German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945 (New York: iUniverse Inc., 2006), 74-103. On the unique personality of Wilhelm II refer to Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 224-27.

11Quoted in Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War, 4.

12Young, German Diplomatic Relations, 85.

13The degree to which German domestic politics (Innenpolitik) and other impersonal forces influenced and determined the course of Germany's foreign policy during the Wilhemine era cannot be treated here. That domestic concerns played a part in the development of German Weltpolitik seems certain but ascertaining to what degree has generated a seemingly endless debate in and of itself in the study of German history. For a concise survey of domestic interpretations of Wilhemine foreign policy see John Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem 1865-1925 (London and New York: Routledge), 143-49.

14Wilhem I was crowned German emperor on January 26^th 1871.

15As quoted in Taylor, Bismark, 215.

16Ibid, 221.

17Divining the reasons behind Bismark's sudden reversal of policy concerning colonies has generated much debate. That it was partially a response to nationalist fervor for colonies seems the only thing agreed upon. For an accessible discussion refer to S. Foester, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson, eds., Bismark, Europe, and Africa (London, 1988). For an interpretation that stresses the primacy of domestic factors in changing Bismark's mind, see H.U. Wehler, “Bismark's Imperialism 1862-1890” in Past and Present, no. 48 (August, 1970), and Paul M. Kennedy, “German Colonial Expansion. Has the 'Manipulated Social Imperialism' Been Ante-Dated? in Past & Present, No. 54 (Feb., 1972) for a critique of this emphasis. A.J.P. Taylor's older interpretation as systematically presented in his short work Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismark's European Policy (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc.) that Bismark changed his colonial policy as a means of forging a possible detente with France by antagonizing Britain over colonial issues (“A grievance had to be created, and Bismark turned to the colonial topics, which he had hitherto despised”, 23) gets dismissed today too quickly. Note for example Paul Kennedy's remarks in idem, 135. Though Taylor's diplomatic heavy interpretation has its problems I think it still has some merit. Kennedy's own interpretation that Bismark gradually changed his policy in response to “controlling territories where German traders were active” (idem, 135) is sensible; see further the author's The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (New York: Humanity Books, 1980), 167-84 for a further elaboration of this viewpoint.

18For background on the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty see William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, 2^nd ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 5-8; A.J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 328-30.

19So the aptly named comprehensive study of Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism.

20Specifically in Samoa. See Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, 620ff; Paul Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-1900 (Dublin/New York, 1974).

21This seizure along with the beginnings of the naval buildup and the start of the Bulow chancellorship with Holstein as state secretary usually marks the beginnings of the Weltpolitik era. Taylor goes so far as to say that Bulow “was the symbol of world policy”; The Struggle for Mastery, 373.

22Lowe, Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem, 115.Lowe's remarks that this was probably not a part of German Weltpolitik but an aberration designed to impress German public opinion seems to me off the mark. Long before the crisis Admiral Tirpitz had marked out this territory as a suitable port for Germany's future navy that he was to eventually spearhead. And so even before these two missionaries were killed both Tirpitz and the Kaiser already had designs on this portion of Chinese territory. Therefore, it seems clear to me that grabbing Kiao-Chow was more than just about impressing public opinion though it was no doubt in part meant to do such. Though note the rhetoric of the Kaiser's remarks as quoted in Langer, Diplomacy, 451: “I am firmly determined to give up our over-cautious policy which is regarded as weak throughout eastern Asia, and to demonstrate through the use of sternness if necessary of the most brutal ruthlessness toward the Chinese, that the German emperor cannot be trifled with.”

23On the Portuguese negotiations see Taylor, Struggle, 481; and Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, 2^nd ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 111-13. These negotiations were one of the last attempts before the war to achieve a detente between the two countries.

24Quoted in Langer, Diplomacy, 624.

25Age of Empire, 67. Likewise, A.J.P. Taylor's comments in The Course of German History (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), 155, “Their only purpose was emotional, an inadequate safety valve for the growing desire that united Germany, as a Great Power, should display all the characteristics of greatness shown by others.”

26Hew Strachan, The First World War Volume I: To Arms (New York: Oxford, 2001), 11.

27Ibid.

28Young, German Diplomatic Relations, 85.

29The reason the passage of the Navy Law of 1898 and its 1890 supplement was such a noteworthy political success is because Tirpitz was able to overcome the traditional strong opposition to a large navy that some of the conservative elements within German society, especially the Prussian army, had historically held towards such a project. For a full survey of the birth of the German Navy and Tirpitz's role in its creation see Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965).

30Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, 201.

31Young, German Diplomatic Relations, 88.

32Lowe, Great Powers, 150.

33Other tenets of British foreign policy at this time: control of the lowland countries (Belgium, Luxembourg) and the prevention of one power dominance on the continent of Europe.

34England's initial reaction to the passage of the first Reichstag Navy Law was actually restrained and lukewarm. It was in fact the Supplementary Naval Bill that jolted the British from their indifference. So Craig, Germany, 312: “The thought that the supplement promised to change the ration between the strength of their own fleet and that of Germany from two to one to three to two was not comforting, and the suspicion was quick to grow that the Germans, who had the strongest army in Europe, were now seeking to build the strongest fleet as well.”

35For a popular account of the first stage of the naval arms race that led to the creation of the first Dreadnought class battle ship see Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991).

36From 1897 to 1912 there were many attempts to forge some kind of an agreement between the two powers. They all eventually failed because German demands for suspension of their naval buildup was only offered if England agreed to absolute neutrality in any war that Germany might in the future find itself engaged in, a price too high for Great Britain to pay. See further Paul M. Kennedy, “German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900 in The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1973), 605-625; Steiner, Britain and the Origins, 44-83. The Haldane Mission was the last significant attempt made to achieve a rapprochement between England and Germany. On the background and failure of the Haldane mission, consult Kennedy, Rise, 450-52.

37Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, 125-48. Actually, emphasizing that the German navy was meant to be a direct challenge to the Royal Navy was one of the key factors in changing the minds of those who had been originally opposed to Tirptiz's naval plans.

38See Langer, Diplomacy, 429, though I think he goes too far when he states that the “phenomenal development of German industry and trade was probably the decisive factor” in affecting German thought when it came to “world policy”, and the building of a navy in particular.

39For a concise examination of the books impact on the Great Powers, see further Langer, Diplomacy, 418-24.

40Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, 142.

41Ibid, 17; emphasis added.

42Though the British did issue a formal protest against the misguided actions of its “alliance” partner, this had more to do with appeasing the United States (at this time Anglo-American relations were remarkably on solid terms) than it did in bringing about condemnation on the actions of Germany. So rightly Taylor, Struggle, 410 n.1.

43So it seems on the scholarly literature as well since even in Taylor's other wise comprehensive study the Venezuelan Affair receives barely a mention most of which comes from the footnote cited above. Moreover, not even in Taylor's extensive bibliographic essay is there listed a work devoted to the Venezuelan Affair. In fact, I could find no single volume account of this incident in the English language. My best source on this matter was Archibald Coolidge; see his The United States as a World Power (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 201-03.

44For these international incidents I have had to depend chiefly on the following two works: Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-06 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930) and Ima C. Barlow, The Agadir Crisis (North Carolina: North Carolina Press, 1940; reprint 1971). To my knowledge these remain the only two full accounts of both Moroccan crises, both of which have long been out of print. This is most unfortunate especially in the case of Anderson's study since it was published before the release of pertinent French documents and is therefore quite inadequate.

45For a list of the marginal grievances that had no real bearing on German actions in this crisis see Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, 147 n.52. Wilhelm agreed to this action much against his will indicating the limited though real influence Bulow and Holstein exerted on German foreign policy at this time; idem, 188.

46Technically, Spain was a part of these secret talks as well but its role was rather minor concerning a small portion of Moroccan territory just across the Iberian peninsula that it historically had ties with. For more on the Spanish role consult Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, 35-40.

47For background on the 1880 Madrid Convention see Barlow, Agadir, 19-21. It should be noted that Germany was in fact on firm legal ground with this action, something that often gets ignored in the literature. Regardless, Germany's subsequent aggressive actions would negate any initial moral high ground she might have had at the beginning of this crisis.

48Declasse had been the architect of the Anglo-French entente of 1904 that witnessed Great Britain officially abandoning its so called “splendid isolation” phase. Thus, as most scholars I have consulted on the first Moroccan crisis have noted part of Germany's actions were no doubt motivated by a desire to disrupt the Anglo-French entente; instead, the first Moroccan crisis strengthened it. For more relating to the effect of the Anglo-French entente on German policy, see Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, 135-59 and Steiner, Britain and the Origins, 32-8.

49So Lowe, “If, following Declasse's fall, the German government had opened bilateral negotiations with France it could have ended the crisis over Morocco with prestige and profit”, Great Powers, 169.

50The clearest statement of a goal came from Prince Lichnowsky, a councilor in the German foreign office who stated only that “We need a success in our foreign policy”, as quoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, 147

51Ibid, 166.

52Germany claimed to be acting for the independence of Morocco thus earning that country's backing at the conference.

53For details on French gains in Morocco see further Taylor, Struggle, 439-40.

54Lowe, Great Powers, 175. This agreement came out of what some see as the actual second Moroccan crisis of 1908. For a survey and examination of this incident, see further Barlow, Agadir, 56-67.

55As with the first Moroccan crisis the Kaiser went along rather reluctantly. Both he and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg wanted nothing to do with this new Moroccan crisis, but Kiderlen was able to persuade both to allow him to direct the foreign policy in this affair; Young, German Diplomatic Relations, 104-07.

56Germany's official reasons for landing at Agadir were similar to France's, namely, it was said to be done for the protection of nationals in the area. That this was demonstrably false was made clear by the choice of Agadir, a closed port with no German nationals within a hundred mile radius of the area; Barlow, Agadir, 231. But here again Germany was initially in the “right” because France's occupation of Fez was a violation of the Madrid Convention of 1880 and a violation of the Franco-German Accord of 1909. Yet just as in the first Moroccan crisis Germany's reckless actions would quickly cause it to lose the moral high ground.

57Barlow, Agadir, 255.

58See n. 47 above.

59One of the turning points in the crisis was a hawkish harangue that came to be known as the “Mansion House Speech” given by the otherwise pacific and later Prime Minister David Lloyd George who at one time was known to have considerable pro-German sympathies. For an examination of the speech, see Barlow, Agadir, 271-99.

60Lowe, Great Powers, 180: “This territory was absorbed into the existing German colony of the Kameruns, providing access to the River Congo, but its size was a mere 275,000 square kilometres with 1 million inhabitants.”

61See n.47 above.

62Germany's choice to refrain from making any colonial requests might partly be explained by the fact that in a rare moment of German history popular opinion concerning colonies was at an all time low. So Taylor, Struggle, 429.

63For the development of German policy and demands during this week, see Barlow, Agadir, 247-55.

64Ibid, 252.

65Ibid, 247.

66On the Anglo-Russo Convention of 1907 see Steiner, Britain and the Origins, 51, 90-1.

67The Franco-Russian agreements of 1892/94, the Anglo-French entente of 1904, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 would form the basis for the Allied Powers of World War I.

68Mombauer, Origins, 8.

69Ibid.

70Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 197.

71Unfortunately, due to space constraints I was not able to cover other cases in which German actions on the world stage created hostility between it and the other powers such as the Kruger Telegram affair, the Baghdad Railway project, and Germany's role in the Balkan crises of 1908-09 and 1912-13. Of these the Kruger Telegram is probably the most important though Taylor probably ascribes to it too much foresight when he says that the “later German excursions into world policy were implicit in the telegram”, Struggle, 366.

72Bismark is partly to blame for this problem because of the tightly and exclusive manner in which he controlled Germany's foreign policy under his Chancellorship.

73Craig, Germany, 303.

74Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 7.

Select Bibliography

Anderson, Eugene N. The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Andrew, C.M. “Weltpolitik and the reshaping of the Dual Alliance.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1 (1966).

Barlow, Ima C. The Agadir Crisis. Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1940.

Craig, Gordon. Germany 1866-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Ferguson, Niall. “Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives.” Historical Journal 35 (1992): 725-52.

Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton, 1967.

Foester, S., W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson, eds. Bismark, Europe, and Africa. London, 1988.

Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.

Hobson, J.A. Imperialism: A Study. London: Nisbit and Co. Limited, 1902; reprint 2010.

Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1995.

Kennan, George F. The Decline of Bismark's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Kennedy, Paul M. “German Colonial Expansion. Has the 'Manipulated Social Imperialism' Been Ante-Dated?” Past and Present, No. 54 (Feb., 1972), 134-41.

_________. “German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897- 1900.” The Journal of Modern History 40 (Dec. 1973): 605-25.

_________. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980.

_________. “The Theory and Practice of Imperialism.” The Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), 761-69.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994.

_________. “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismark.” Daedalus, Vol. 97, No. 3, Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (Summer, 1968), 888-924.

Langer, William L. “A Critique of Imperialism.” Foreign Affairs, Vol.14, No. 1 (Oct., 1935), 102-19.

_________. European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890. Second edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

_________. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. 2 Volumes. Second edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

Lowe, John. The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem, 1865-1925. London: Routledge, 1994.

McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Mombauer, Annika. The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus. London: Longman, 2002.

Parkenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent From 1876 to 1912. New York: Random House, 1991.

Pflanze, Otto, ed. The Unification of Germany 1848-1871. Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1968.

Steinberg, Jonathan. “The Copenhagen Complex.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1914 (Jul., 1966), 23-46.

_________. Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Steiner, Zara S. and Keith Neilson. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. Second edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Strachan, Hew. The First World War Volume I: To Arms. New York: Oxford, 2001.

Taylor, A.J.P. Bismark: The Man and the Statesman. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955.

_________. The Course of German History. With a new introduction by Chris Wrigley London: Routledge Classics, 2001

__________. Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismark's European Policy. New York: W.W. Norton, 1970.

__________. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Wehler, H.U. “Bismark's Imperialism: 1862-1890.” Past and Present, No. 48, Aug 1970.

Young, William. German Diplomatic Relations, 1871-1945. New York: iU Inc.,2006.

Afghan Zombies!

Okay so I'm about done with that promised biblical zombies post but I just had to share this first (via Daniel Drezner):

Chancellor Otto Von Bismark's Voice

My primary field of historical interest these days is diplomatic history and one of the most important figures in this field is the former first chancellor of Germany Otto Von Bismark (1815-1898). Bismark is known and remembered for many things among them the unification of the German states into one country (1871), his Realpolitik approach to foreign policy, and his vigorous efforts towards maintaining a strong "balance of power" system in Europe. And like many realists before and after (Note: Henry Kissinger often cited Bismark as an influence on his thought) Bismark tends to be a divisive figure among intellectuals of every stripe since it can be reasonably argued that Bismark's policies were the beginnings of a slippery slope to WWI, chiefly because his unification of the German states created another strong power in Europe that would eventually foment hostility on the Continent; likewise because of the many secret pacts Bismark created which are additionally often cited as a cause of WWI.

Nevertheless, Bismark was a remarkable statesmen, worthy of continued study today and it was with great surprise that the world learned of a long lost recording of his voice found hidden away in a Thomas Edison archive in New Jersey. Apparently, it was recorded in 1889 and features Bismark reciting some words from an American song of some kind, a poem in Latin, and then some German literature. The quality is of course poor but there's still something awe-inspiring about hearing the actual voice of such an important historical figure as this. Anyways, here's the clip (via Librarything.com, via Open Salon):

Reasons for Delay....and What I've Read and What I am Currently Reading

Well, many things have happened at once that will delay my promised posts. Because of some emergencies at work my part-time job as become full time for a while and my classes have started in full and already are proving intensive. So it will be two weeks or so before I can get back into a regular routine.

Someone asked me on a forum the other day what I had read so far this year and what I'm currently reading and since right now I don't have anything else to post I'm going to share that for the time being:

What I have read for the year so far:

1. The Path Between the Seas (David McCullough)- A solid, popular history of the conception and building of the Panama canal.

2. The Man in the High Castle (Philip K. Dick)- I'm a fan of Philip K. Dick's work but only recently got around to reading this intriguing counter-factual historical fiction set in an alternate past in which Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were the victors of WWII.

3. The Coming of the Revolution (L.H. Gipson)- A study in the origins of the American Revolution with an emphasis on the British side of the conflict.

4. Death of a Salesman (Arthur Miller)-A classic American play worth reading (and seeing!). However, do not read it in a depressed or melancholy state.

5. Undisputed (Chris Jericho)- The second part of Chris Jericho's autobiography. Not quite as funny as his first A Lion's Tale but still quite entertaining.

6. The Naked Ape (Desmond Morris)- A blunt, zoological and evolutionary take on the human animal. My evolutionary fix for the month.

7. The Varieties of Religious Experience (William James)- A classic psychological study of the various characteristics of religious phenomena; an easier read than one might initially suspect.

8. The Jewish Mind (Raphael Patai)- An intellectual history of the Jewish mind. A little on the verbose and pedantic side but informative nonetheless.

9. Racism: A Brief History (George Fredrickson)- One of the best introductions to this topic I've read so far. A great place to start for the uninitiated.

10. A Game of Thrones (George R.R. Martin)-I reluctantly jumped on this bandwagon and am very glad that I did. Though I found the initial reading difficult and a bit boring at first it eventually found its rhythm and by the end of the book I was immensely satisfied. I've started watching the HBO series that is based on this book and so far it has been an excellent adaptation.

In progress:

1. A Brief History of the Jewish People (Raymond Scheindlin)- Treads ground that I've covered many times over so a bit tedious of a read. Plus, the author accepts certain things as factual that scholars have long since declared other wise such as the myth that Rabbinic Judaism began at the Council of Yavneh just after the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple.

2. The Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith)- A classic economic work. My on and off read that I've mentioned before.

3. Origins of the American Revolution (John C. Miller)- An older but fairly comprehensive study of the origins of the American rebellion.

4. Empires in World History (Burbank et al)- A study of world empires from a macro historical perspective.

5. A History of Ancient Israel and Judah (Maxwell and Hayes)- A study of the origins of Israelite society up to the Persian period. The approach here is a historical-critical one and not a confessional and/or faith one.

6. Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250-1350 (Janet L. Abu-Lugold)- I just started this one so I don't have anything to say about it yet.

Zombies, Muppets, and Female Orgasms, Oh My!

I know that not too many people read this blog, something I knew would probably be the case when I started it a year ago. I think this is partly because I don't have a particular niche that I fit in though on the whole I do write about history proportionately more than other topics. I simply don't like to be pigeonholed and have many varied interests that I want to express on my blog.

This blog was started chiefly for two reasons: (1) boredom; during the downward phase of my deployment in Afghanistan I had a lot of free time and needed to find something else to do besides reading and working out; and (2) writing discipline; I also knew that eventually I would be back in academia and so realized that it would be essential to get myself back into the habit of writing as frequently as possible. In other words, I knew beforehand this blog was unlikely to catch on with many people but that was never the intention. This blog has chiefly been for my own benefit. And for those of you who do take the time to read it rest assured that I am deeply grateful.

Nonetheless, I do occasionally take a cursory look at the most popular search queries that lead people to this blog and I thought I would share them. Here are the top three:

1. Zombies. By far this is the most popular and those that happen upon my blog do so because of my The Geopolitics of Zombies post. It remains the one with the most page views but I highly doubt it has ever convinced anyone to subscribe to my blog simply because I'm sure the people that are putting "zombies" in their search engines were not looking for a quasi-academic treatment of the undead.

2. Female Orgasms. No surprise that this is a popular search query. My two posts on this subject (here and here) also have quite a few page views. Of course the people that were searching for this topic probably weren't looking for the kind of intellectual stimulation that I was providing but rather for an altogether different kind of gratification. Other search terms related to this subject that directed people to my blog: clits, clitoris, evolution of the clit, women cumming, mystery of female orgasms, et al.

3. The Muppets. This one was a surprise but a pleasant one. I've said many times that I'm a Muppets fan and its immensely satisfying to see that there are apparently still quite a few other fans out there given how many page views my A Very Muppets Post has received. Still, I guess not even the Muppets could supersede the compelling subjects of female sexual climaxes and the living dead.

And so because of the popularity of these subjects I've decided to center my next three posts on these respective topics. (I toyed with finding a way to incorporate all three into one post but alas realized I could not unless I was doing a combined review of Peter Jackson's Braindead and Meet the Feebles.) You're probably now wondering why I would do something like this with the obvious intention of directing even more traffic to my blog when I just explained that was not what I was looking for. Well, the answer is that I'm human and so a bit prideful. Truthfully, it would be nice to have more readers :). Anyways, as a teaser here are the titles for the upcoming posts (subject to revision of course):

1. Biblical Zombies? An Examination of Matthew 27: 52-53

2. Re-revisiting the Female Orgasm

3. The Top ____ Adult Oriented Muppet Moments

Ramblings on Henry Kissinger's "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"

Every so often I get the urge to read one of Henry Kissinger's books. Recently, I finished his first published one entitled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, a study that was commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations to assess just how significantly power relations, particularly between the US and the Soviet Union, had been altered by the introduction of nuclear weapons to the post-war world. Though published in 1957 I think it's a work that's still applicable for American foreign policy today even if the world no longer lives under the threat of a nuclear holocaust. I started out trying to do a proper review of the book for the site but struggled because there are so many different (though interrelated) themes that Kissinger tackles in this remarkable work. Instead I'm just going to list some of the more important insights that I gleaned from the book.

1.) The concept of a limited war is a foreign one to American policymakers chiefly because of US preoccupation with total warfare doctrines extrapolated from the overwhelming experiences of two world wars, both of which were "total" wars.

2.) Additionally, US failure to comprehend limited warfare principles has led to an unnatural divorce between diplomacy and war thus violating Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is politics by other means."

3.) Example: The Korean War; mishandled because the US found itself forced into a limited war that it could never determine how to conduct, evidenced by confused political and military objectives both at the outset of the war and at its end. "Korea caught us completely unprepared, not only militarily but above all in doctrine." (p. 30)

4.) Chief inquiries of the book: has the proliferation of nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the nature of diplomacy? (Kissinger thinks not) Is it possible to engage in limited nuclear warfare? (Kissinger suggests it is). Kissinger notes that most don't believe the latter to be possible; prevailing wisdom is that once nuclear weapons become entered into the equation all out nuclear war becomes inevitable. "The arguments against limited nuclear war are persuasive...in the absence of a natural cutoff point, it is argued, the employment of any nuclear weapon may start a cycle of gradually expanding commitments ending in all-out war." (145)

5.) Kissinger thinks this conclusion is misguided resting as it does on the ever so tenuous slippery slope argument (aka gateway argument). He argues that limited nuclear warfare would be possible if the following conditions were to apply: conducted with highly mobile units only, restrictions agreed by both sides on what could be considered legitimate targets (e.g., bans on certain kinds of infrastructure and large population centers), and a limit to the amount of megatonnage that can be used by the participants.

6.) Kissinger also suggests that the US should re-evaluate the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) because he thinks that, one, the allies aren't bearing enough of the deterrent burden and, two, that they most likely wouldn't have the will to face down Soviet aggression in their spheres of influence. "What if the Red Army attacks in Europe explicitly to disarm West Germany, offering the United States and the United Kingdom immunity from strategic bombing and promising to withdraw to the Oder after achieving its limited objective? Is it clear France would fight under such circumstances? Or that the United Kingdom would initiate all out war which, however it ended, might mean the end of British civilization?" (205)

7.) Domestically, Kissinger suggests an overhaul of the relations between the various military departments in the US, specifically arguing for more centralization in military policy.

8.) Kissinger provides an adroit analysis of Soviet (and Chinese) foreign policy. He describes it as one of "strategic ambiguity". "The nature of the Soviet challenge is, therefore, inherently ambiguous. It uses the 'legitimate' language of its opponents in a fashion that distorts its meaning and increases the hesitations on the other side." (58); Furthermore, mirroring some of the arguments put forth by George Kennan (the so-called father of containment theory) Kissinger states that Soviet policy is essentially expansionist, i.e., it seeks to expand its security sphere via limited aggression taking advantage of US reluctance to engage in limited warfare for fear of escalation into total war and, hence, nuclear annihilation. Strategic advantage: Soviet Union.

As I said this was written in 1957 but it remains a solid work . I don't agree with everything Kissinger argues in the book, particularly his position on limited nuclear warfare. While I accept that the slippery slope argument is dubious where I think his argument is problematic is with the conditions he says must apply if limited nuclear warfare is to be feasible. The difficulty with this position is that it depends on the Soviet Union agreeing and then abiding by said conditions when it's likely that they wouldn't except as another means of taking advantage of the US through its "strategy of ambiguity" by for example accepting the conditions but then failing to adhere to them.

The real value of the book for present American foreign policy needs is to be found in Kissinger's discussion about US failure to comprehend the nature of limited warfare. When it comes to warfare the US's myopic perspective forces it to think that there is only ever one option, namely, total war. This failure to develop a robust doctrine of limited warfare partially accounts for the many international blunders the US has been in since WWII (the Gulf War maybe being the sole exception though I have my problems with the way that war was conducted). In many ways this is a reflection of the still very immature foreign policy of the US. It's easy to forget that this is still a relatively young nation that has yet to form and solidify its own tradition of foreign policy. In many respects this country still operates from a belief that diplomacy and warfare are essentially separate modes of engaging with other states. For the most part this is faulty reasoning and these two ways of dealing with other countries should never be entirely unlinked from one another. And until this is grasped America will continue to misuse its own might. To sum up the development of a healthy doctrine of limited warfare is essential in the avoidance of more foreign policy blunders by the United States something that becomes increasingly more crucial as the United States begins its decline as the sole superpower.

Lastest Video Review: Jet Li's "The Master"

A review of an early Jet Li film:

Musings on "The Whistle Blower"

It's always a pleasant surprise when separate spheres of one's own interests overlap. This happened for me the other night when I watched a British political thriller called The Whistle Blower which was suggested to me by that quasi entity known as Netflix based on a recent interest I've taken in a TV show called Burn Notice (A friend gave me some of the episodes to watch while in Afghanistan but under the mistaken notion that the USA network ceased long ago producing quality original programming I kept putting off trying the show out until a few weeks ago and now Burn Notice is quickly becoming one of my favorite TV shows. Bravo, USA Network).

I was about to ignore the suggestion when I noticed that the movie starred a favorite actor of mine, Sir Michael Caine. So I thought why not go ahead and give it a go. Forty-five minutes in I almost gave up on it because the pacing was excruciatingly slow (even by 80's film standards), Michael Caine was so far barely in it, and I was getting aggravated at how I perceived the plot to be unfolding, namely, toward the revelation of a secret cabal composed of elderly white men influencing and directing world affairs, a trite plot device of political thrillers used and abused many times over (A good exception was the unfortunately short lived AMC show, Rubicon, which gave that worn plot device a fresh and unique spin.). But I decided to give it a stay of execution and continued on.

I guess I should try to convey as best I can the plot. The movie (based on a book of the same name) is about Michael Caine's character, Frank Jones, a Royal Navy veteran who gets caught up in a potential government cover up relating to the possible existence of a top level Russian spy in the British government. Frank's son, a linguist who works for one of the British intelligence agencies, through a series of events including the mysterious deaths of two of his colleagues begins to suspect that the British government is sinisterly involved in some secret affair. He makes these concerns known to his father who doesn't take them seriously, believing his son's paranoia to be related to his voracious interest in spy novels and all things clandestine.

But then his son suddenly dies. The police rule it an unfortunate accident but given what his son had just expressed to him the day before about a possible government conspiracy Frank refuses to accept their conclusion. From then on the film centers on Frank's tortured quest to find out the truth about his son's death. And it was here that I became hooked, mostly because Caine's acting was, as usual, phenomenal, his anguish and determination compelling you to see how his quest ends. Eventually he does sort things out, learning that there is indeed a turncoat in the British government and that the government has been aware of this for some time. However, they have yet to act, deciding instead to take some time to assess the damage the spy has done. Furthermore, the British fear that the United States will find out about this and then refuse the British access to their CIA spy network, something the powers that be in Whitehall deem necessary for the national security of the country. And thus they have "dealt with" those who have come close to revealing the Russian spy, including Frank's son. In short, Frank's son was deemed expendable for reasons of national security.

It is with considerable angst that Frank uncovers this truth. Intriguingly, though, he seems to accept the necessity of his son's death, albeit with grave agony. Yet, what he founds unacceptable is that the government has, for the time being, decided to let the spy remain as he is. This Frank simply cannot abide and upon learning the identity of the traitor seeks him out in order to try and force a confession from him. But in addition to extracting a confession from the man, Frank wants to know why he betrayed his country. The spy explains that his actions were the result of a resentment he had been cultivating ever since WWII when the former British empire became a subordinate power to the United States and the Soviet Union, citing events such as the Suez Affair as a prime indicator of this new reality. Britain, he goes on to assert, is slowly being squeezed out by the two new superpowers. Furthermore, he views the United States as the bully who has been forcing British interests to fall in line with its own policy and so decided to cast his support to the Russians. Frank finds this explanation incredulous, prompting him to ask: "Well, why don't you just live in Russia then?" to which the turncoat has no reply. From there the movie ends the only way it can and since I don't want to divulge everything about the movie I'll cease here with the plot description.

This movie really surprised me and in a good way. It has to be one of the more realistic political thrillers that I have seen. Everything makes sense in it: from the actions of the lay characters to the motivations of the government officials. It is all quite sensible, especially the rational basis the traitor gives for why he decided to betray his own country. In short, the movie is, well, believable. A trait I think of the utmost importance for spy thrillers.

Ok, I know that's not a profound assessment of the value of this movie but it is true and rings true to me especially. This is because for the past several months I've been studying British history (specifically their side of the American Revolution) as well as Anglo-American relations since WWII. And so the actions and grievances of the major players in this movie is an interesting reflection of some of my current interests. In sum, my love of movies and my current research interests fortuitously overlapped in a most pleasant manner. And it's always a great joy to me when that happens. Thank you, Netflix, for the excellent suggestion. You chose....wisely.

Reflections on "Lost", Romans 9, and Purpose

I have been working on getting my second video review done so I don't have a new post available this week so I'm going to post something I wrote in my journal several years ago about the TV show "Lost" and Romans chapter 9. Note, it was written when "Lost" was still in its first season and fresh (I was ultimately let down by the conclusion of that otherwise entertaining show) and during a time of personal anguish which accounts for some of the emotional under current of the journal entry.

One of the few television shows that I keep up with is "Lost". So far this show has many of the elements that I enjoy in a TV series. The thrust of the show is this: Oceanic Flight 815 has crashed on an unknown and mysterious island. The survivors of the crash are ultimately trying to find a way off the island but at the same time are trying to uncover some of its mysteries. Now this premise is in no way unique but the creators of the show, J.J. Abrams and Damon Lindelof, added one interesting feature to this often used plot device which, in my opinion, gives it a fresh spin. In short, they gave the island a personality. And it's this "personality" that in some manner, I suspect, is the source for many of the oddities of the island such as polar bears, an invisible monster that devours people, the miraculous healing of a former paraplegic, just to name a few.

Now this former paraplegic is one of the central characters of the show. He is John Locke, named after the famous philosopher who developed a theory of epistemology which argued that humans were not born with innate ideas. Instead they come into the world with a tabula resa or blank slate in which knowledge and, ultimately, experiences are "chiseled" into over time. In other words, Locke squarely came down on the side of nurture in the seemingly interminable "nature vs nuture" debate. Incidentally, one of the episodes in season 1 is named "Tabula Resa".

Obviously, because of his seemingly supernatural healing, Locke is the most driven of the survivors to unlocking the secrets of the island. It is Locke who constantly refers to the island as an entity. Furthermore, it is Locke who sees purpose in everything that has been happening on the island summed up when he tells one of the other characters that "it is the Island that brought us here." Ultimately, Locke is the man of faith who sees purpose and destiny in everything that has happened to the survivors. And if Locke is the man of faith on the island then without a doubt Jack Shepherd, the surgeon, is the man of doubt. In fact, in a heated argument between the two concerning the island Jack explicitly tells Locke that he doesn't believe in purpose or fate and vehemently argues that everything that has happened can be ascribed to a series of coincidences.

Maybe it is too much of a generalization but it seems to me that these two types of characters represent the divide that most people fall into when it comes to questions of fate and randomness. Some are inclined to see purpose in everything while others are satisfied to relegate everything to the workings of chance. I guess I have grown up being one of the former. Some of which surely stems from my love of certain movies like Star Wars that heavily involve a motif of destiny in their plots. But mostly this comes from my Christian heritage. You see when you grow up in a Christian atmosphere you are constantly told that God has a purpose for your life. Indeed, the preferred text cited in support of this notion is almost always Jeremiah 29:11 which states, "For I know the plans I have for you, declares YHWH, plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you a hope and a future."

But the older I get the less sense this viewpoint of "God having a purpose for everyone" makes. To be honest, I'm inclined towards the negative of that statement which, incidentally, seems to be supported by the texts deemed in some sense sacred and divine by Christians. One need look no further than Romans chapter 9. Now I've stated before that I don't think the Calvinist interpretation of this chapter, i.e., that it is concerned with God's right to predestine some to eternal salvation and, at least passively, the rest to eternal damnation. But one thing is clear to me now: this passage is definitely about God's sovereignty in election to promise (purpose).

The problem that Paul is exploring in this chapter is the seemingly apparent rejection of the Jews in favor of the Gentiles displayed in the fact that so few Jews are accepting the gospel message. If this is the case then it would seem, Paul implies, that God's promises have failed. But Paul of course immediately rejects this implication with a hefty, "God forbid!".

Yet through all of Rom 9-11 Paul fails to give us a clear solution to this problem. But what he does say is nevertheless important, namely, that God's choice of receives promise (purpose) has always began with his election and mercy, and therefore not based on anything in man or of man. To support this Paul cites the example of God's choice of Jacob over Esau: "Before they had been born and before they had done anything evil or good, so that God's purpose in election might stand not on man who wills but on he who shows mercy, it was told to Sarah that the 'elder shall serve the younger'". Then Paul quotes from Malachi to further strengthen his argument: "For it is written, 'Jacob I have loved, Esau I have hated.'" Though most scholars understand this harsh saying to be a Hebrew idiom meaning simply "Jacob I have chosen, Esau I have rejected" we should not let this detract from the harshness of the saying. The impact is the same: God's purpose for people begins solely from His own purposes. For no reason but his own, God chose Jacob over Esau to be the child of promise, through whom would emerge Israel, his chosen people. This is reinforced by the fact that by birthright Esau should have been the chosen because he was the first born but God upended this traditional mode of election by choosing the second born. In short, God gives purpose to some and not to others.

Now though I've rejected the traditional Calvinist interpretation of this chapter which Calvin himself called "The Terrible Decree" that sees this as about predestination, I wonder if my interpretation is not at least as terrible? Indeed, God choosing only some for purpose seems a hair's breadth from the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.

But some might try to reply to my argument by quoting Romans 8:28 which states that "God works all things for good." But in reality, that passage has some restrictions that many miss. You have to love God and more importantly you have to be called according to His purpose. For this is what the passage actually says: "For God works all things for good to those who love him and who are called according to his purpose."

What can be inferred except that not all are called according to purpose? And again, if this is the case, is this not just as terrible an implication as Calvin's "terrible decree"? I guess then it is God who decides who will be the John Lockes and Jack Shepherds.

A Very Muppets Post

Well, I'm sure that most of you are aware that I'm a Muppets' fan and so in honor of the latest Muppets' movie release I give you ten great Muppet moments. Enjoy and Happy Thanksgiving.

10.) It only seems right to start with the classic opening theme to the original show:



9.) Muppets Bohemian Rhapsody:



8.) Koozebanian Mating Ritual:



7.) Veterinarian's Hospital-Bread:



6.) Treasure Island Roll Call:



5.) Muppet's Christmas Carol Scrooge Song:



4.) Muppets try out for Star Wars:



3.) Muppets Take Manhattan Wedding Song:



2.) Great Muppet Caper: Happiness Hotel Song:



1.) And of course the classic Manamana:



And since it is Thanksgiving here's a bonus video from the Swedish Chef:

The Eclipse of World War I

Several days ago the nation celebrated Veteran's Day. I had planned to write on that day but it coincided with the day of my grandmother's funeral. Now even before I became a veteran I've always been uneasy with the fact that this country celebrates its war veterans annually on Nov. 11th. Originally, this day marked Armistice Day, the day in which WWI unofficially came to an end with a cease fire between the Allied and Central Powers. My concern is that by celebrating all veterans of every US war on this single day risks obscuring the memory and significance of what once was universally called "The Great War".

To a large degree this has already happened. The relegation, indeed subordination, of WWI to other events of the 20th century, specifically of course WWII, can be readily observed by visiting your conventional US bookstore. On average there are only a handful of books on WWI compared to dozens of books on WWII and the Vietnam War (As an aside I should note that the Korean War gets the shortest shrift of all with at most two or three books on that often neglected conflict.) Moreover, there is only one memorial in D.C. dedicated to the fallen soldiers of WWI and it is in a state of disrepair.

Why the neglect? Well, there are many reasons but only a few worth mentioning here. For one, it must be recalled that though the US was an eventual participant in the "Great War" it was so only very belatedly. WWI began in August of 1914, the US did not declare war on Germany until April of 1917, and even then didn't actually start contributing troops to Europe until May of 1918. The war was then mercifully over about 6 months later. Thus compared to the horrible costs paid by Britain and France after four years of a literal hell on earth in the trenches, the material and spiritual investment of the United States to that war was nearly negligible. This lack of comparative sacrifice was then exacerbated by the combined naivete and idealism of Woodrow Wilson's preachy diplomacy during the peace process with the other three principal world leaders (Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando). In short, aside from the late and brief role played by the US, WWI was essentially from beginning to end a European war. And except for the inculcation of an unfortunate isolationist mindset, the Great War left very little of an impression on the minds of the American people partially reflected in the eventual refusal of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

Another factor, related to the previous point above, in the eclipse of WWI has to do with the relationship often assigned to that war vis a vis WWII. Often, WWI is seen, at best, as the prequel, or, at worst, as the prologue to WWII. Indeed, most interpreters of WWII believe that in many significant ways WWI was the cause of WWII. Largely this has to do with the causal value given to the peace treaty that officially ended WWI, namely, The Treaty of Versailles. Subsequent Germans, most notoriously Adolf Hitler, often cited the "cruel and harsh" peace inflicted on them by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (specifically concerning the so-called "war guilt clause" which supposedly forced the Germans to accept full blame for causing the Great War) as justification for their grievances against the other powers of Europe. (Many historians have bought into this argument. I for one am skeptical of this view....a post for another time though.)

Also, WWII is a war that's a bit easier for people to understand both in terms of the causes of the war and the cast of colorful characters that were involved: Hitler, Stalin, FDR, Churchill, etc (Yes, Churchill was involved in WWI but not as centrally.). In contrast, apart from Woodrow Wilson, most people wouldn't be able to tell you whom the world leaders were during WWI. Additionally on this score, the "evil" of WWII was something much clearer from a moral perspective. Nazi Germany and Japanese aggression were lucid factors that led to WWII and therefore easier to grasp as opposed to the myriad of components (secret alliances, foolish treaty obligations, naval arms race, Prussian militarism, Austria-Hungarian designs on the Balkans, Russian concern for the Slavic races, etc) traditionally said to have created the conditions for WWI.

Lastly, though I've already hit on this point, WWII unlike WWI featured the US prominently, decisively even (though it didn't officially enter until late 1941 when the war began in September of 1939). Pearl Harbor, D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, Yalta, Iwo Jima, etc. were all major events which involved the United States. In most every way then WWII was demonstrably a United States war whereas WWI was essentially a peripheral conflict that the US only very lately contributed to.

And for all of these reasons WWI becomes eclipsed by WWII and later US events of the 20th century. For my part I think this is most unfortunate. WWI in my opinion still deserves, as the British and other Europeans continue to call it, to be known as the Great War. Its significance should not be understated and in a future post I will seek to lay out just how important of an event WWI really was for the 20th century and not just in the limited sense that it was the cause for what most people see as the greater of the two world wars.

RIP Grandma

Typically, I try not to write about personal events on this blog but I want to make an exception for this post. Today, I lost my last grandparent, Grandma Elder, my maternal grandmother. It wasn't a huge surprise since she had been in the hospital for about a month fighting an infection. Still, I think we are all experiencing grief...especially those who were holding out hope that she might recover. I will miss her greatly....and not just because of the excellent home cooked meals that I would receive when visiting her or staying the night. She was a very generous person who lived a very difficult life. Nevertheless, she was always willing to help out her kids and grandkids. This included me. Before I deployed to Afghanistan I was in a bad financial position because I had left my job in Chattanooga at the time to come home to get ready for mobilization. But, as is the Army way, they kept delaying my mobilization which squeezed my finances. It was my grandmother who loaned me some money that enabled me to get through until I did finally leave the country. I will never forget that.

Another thing I will always remember about Grandma Elder is her sharp mind. Everyday that I was there she would be working on crossword puzzles and usually finished them completely. And though her memory often failed her towards the end of her life she still knew if the slightest thing in her kitchen was out of place! I have no doubt that had she been born in a later time period where women had more opportunities to advance that she would have gone on to great things. Wait...that's not fair. Raising six kids and many, many grandkids is a testament to the fact that she did do great things in her life.

Over the last several years my religious worldview has gone through some drastic changes...."refinement" is the way I like to phrase it, though that's probably a bit disingenuous. But I'm still a theist who believes in a just universe and therefore a just creator. And if I believe such then it seems to follow (though not necessarily) that there will be an "afterlife" of some kind...though I intensely dislike that word. I care not really to fruitlessly speculate on what it might be like but I do hope that it would be something akin to the classic Judeo-Christian (and Islamic) belief in the resurrection of the dead (Yes, I know those choice of words conjure images of zombies stumbling out of their graves to walk the earth. Still...) and redemption of the created order....much more appealing than the now popular (among modern day evangelical Christians at least) conception of an eternity floating about "heaven" as disembodied souls.

Nonetheless, if my vestigial Christian belief turns out to be well founded then I truly look forward to the day when I see my grandmother again at the Day of the Resurrection. I will severely miss you, Grandma. Rest in peace...for now.

"In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall all be changed." (I Cor 15:52 KJV)

And Now for Something Completely Different...

I have been a viewer of a website called thatguywiththeglasses.com which is basically a place where many different kinds of personalities do reviews of their genre of choice. Most of them are reviews of bad films and games which is where it is easiest to extract humor. For years I've had a passion for two things: video editing (that I've been doing since VHS days) and Martial Arts films. I've combined the two in the past but I wanted to try and do something akin to those reviewers that I watch. So for the past month I've been working on my first video. I don't really know if this is the kind of forum for presenting this project and it is doubtful that I will continue to link to these reviews if I should decide to do more of them because this blog is meant to be my sort of intellectual sphere. I have a lot still to work on, principally learning to be more natural and casual with the narration and not so "professorial" or stolid. Anyways, here are the links to my first video. Hopefully, those of you who choose to watch it will be at least moderately entertained.