Skepticism as the Default Position of the Historian

As much as I love the study of history I am probably one of those few aspiring historians who is skeptical that we can accurately glean so-called transparent "lessons" from history. I was reminded of this by two things this week. First, I got into a marginal debate on a forum at Librarything.com because a couple of members glibly replied that had the United States and Britain more carefully studied the history of the Anglo-Afghan wars they probably would have been deterred from invading Afghanistan. (I've already briefly mentioned the mistaken interpretation many have regarding the Anglo-Afghan wars in another post [here, #11-13] so I'm not going to revisit that conflict in this one; I'm planning on a future post that will examine the Anglo-Afghan wars more comprehensively). Then I read a post at the National Interest blog that examined how the 1930s appeasement policies of Hitler tend to be misused (one could even argue, exploited). The major example in that article has to do with Libya and Qaddafi but many other examples abound such as Bush 41's reference to Saddam Hussein as a Middle East Hitler figure; in my mind a half-assed attempt to provide moral justification for the Gulf War.

Anyways, these two events this past week reminded me of how often policy makers, political pundits, journalists, historians, etc misappropriate history because many of them believe that history is (mostly) inherently didactic. Now I'm not saying that history can't or doesn't teach lessons. What I am saying however is that you are guaranteed to misinterpret historical events (and by extension misapply them) if you start with the premise that the principal purpose of history is to be some kind of "instructor". History is much too complex of an entity for simplification and so will almost always stymie attempts to extract clear cut principles from it.

Another matter that I want to mention in terms of historical methodology relates to an incident I had in one of my classes the other day (I enrolled in a local community college to take history courses to pad out my transcript for when I start applying to graduate schools this fall.). My history instructor briefly spoke about the various degrees of sources historians use in their task of writing and interpreting history. He of course emphasized the value of primary sources over secondary ones which I didn't have a problem with. All things being equal a primary source is usually going to convey more accurate information than a secondary one. My problem had to do with his additional comments that imparted a kind of infallibility to primary sources. As many historians have long come to realize primary sources don't always contain accurate historical information since many of them consist of things like political memoirs which were most certainly edited (and in some cases distorted) by many of the authors who were motivated to make such changes because they knew they were writing for posterity. An example of this is Winston Churchill's otherwise fine WWII memoirs in which he omits vital information from certain periods of the war (e.g., the summit at Yalta) that might have cast the great war leader in a less positive light. In other words, primary sources have to be given the same kind of scrutiny that we give to secondary sources.

The bottom line with everything that I have said is this: historians need to be more skeptical. Better yet, their default position should be one of skepticism. If there is one chief principle in the discipline of history this is it. Yes, I'm aware that this is epistemologically old fashioned, and yes, I'm aware that it's impossible for anyone to be wholly objective and impartial. But to my mind that doesn't mean we shouldn't try our damnedest to be. Simply put, I think a lot more humility is required from those of us who study history. And a reassertion of skepticism as the starting axiom of our studies would go a long way towards this goal.

Why the International Community Wants Qaddafi Gone

The rebel alliance in Libya is now poised to assume full control of Tripoli, and perhaps all of Libya, having recently taken Qaddafi's compound (not surprisingly, the dictator was nowhere to be found). Now that the war in Libya is again front page news I feel compelled to finally make some remarks about this conflict. However, I want to narrowly focus on why since the very beginning of this war the International Community (hereafter IC), particularly Europe, have enthusiastically backed NATO operations in Libya. I should say first that when the revolution in Libya began and Qaddafi's unsurprisingly ruthless crackdown immediately followed I was struck by how quickly the IC backed the rebel factions in Libya. I was (and still am) especially baffled by Russia and China's signature of approval on UN Security Coucil Resolution 1970 after both had previously said they would veto any such resolution that might come before the UN Security Council in terms of the revolution in Libya (Note that Russia gave its approval only after securing a proviso which stated that NATO could not use the resolution as a pretext for an invasion of the country.).

To understand what I'm getting at you have to split Qaddafi's fourty-two year reign of power into two phases: Pre-Lockerbie Bombing Qaddafi and Post-Lockerbie Bombing Qaddafi. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the Lockerbie bombing it was a terrorist act most likely sanctioned by Qaddafi that blew up flight Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killing 213 passengers and 16 crew members. Now before this international incident Qaddafi had been a pain the ass for the IC (not to mention to his own people) ever since he assumed power after he initiated a successful military coup in 1969. He was behind countless terrorist operations that if accurately tallied might amount to many more deaths than that achieved by Al Qaeda on 9/11. Most of these were committed against Israel, a particularly loathesome entity in Qaddafi's foreign policy worldview. Indeed, no other foreign policy matter preoccupied Qaddafi so obsessively as did Israel's irritating existence in the Arab world. And though initially a rallying force in Africa, Qaddafi soon earned the ire of his African neighbors by continuously intervening in the domestic affairs of countries like Tunisia, Sudan, and especially Chad which eventually resulted in an all out war between those two countries with the result that Qaddafi suffered a humiliating defeat. Qaddafi even managed to alienate an important ally, Egypt, by consistently meddling in its affairs which also resulted in a war between the two. And of course most famously Qaddafi provoked Reagan's bombing of Libya in 1986, a response in large part to the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing that resulted in the death of three US servicemen and the injury of hundreds more.

There is much more that I'm leaving out in this narrative of Qaddafi's rule before Lockerbie but suffice it to say he was a menace to the IC. But of course he was tolerated, especially by Europe, because of an important asset his country had: oil. Things, however, finally changed after convincing evidence linked Qaddafi to the horrible Lockerbie bombing mentioned above. This tragedy ultimately convinced the IC to impose crippling economic sanctions on Libya that was instrumental in finally convincing Qaddafi to attempt a rapprochment with the West. The first major move Qaddafi made came in 1999 when, through the mediation of Nelson Mandela, he permitted the extradition of the two Libyans who had been convicted of the Lockerbie bombing after a thorough investigation of that tragic event. Subsequently in 2002, Qaddafi took formal responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing agreeing to a 2.7 billion compensation for the families of those killed in the bombing. Then in 2004 Qaddafi allowed UN inspectors into his country and followed this up by agreeing to dismantle his WMD progam (which he did). Furthermore, Qaddafi became a willing and important asset to the United States during the war on terror. Another conciliating move Qaddafi made was to relax many of his nationalization of Libyan oil policies that he had begun back in 1973. And lastly, as well as most surprisingly, Qaddafi significantly eased his hostility toward Israel even to a small degree participating in some of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. In short, whether out of a genuine repentance of mind (least likely) or from an instinctual need for survival (more likely), Qaddafi turned face and ceased conducting a reprehensible foreign policy vis a vis the IC.

The point that I'm trying to make here is that it took an awful lot of effort from the IC to bring Qaddafi to the point he was before the Arab spring began. Thus, my genuine surprise as to the abrupt way in which the IC hastily gave its initial verbal support to the Libyan rebels. So what is going on here? The best that I can surmise is that the IC has always been nervous that Qaddafi might backslide to his former ways so that when the rebels looked like they were going to achieve a quick victory the IC jumped at the opportunity to back the group that they believed would quickly topple Qaddafi. But it soon became clear that the rebels were not going to achieve victory on their own. Worse still, it looked as if Qaddafi would be successful in crushing the rebellion. This probability I believe made the IC quick to intervene. Why? Because they realized that if Qaddafi regained complete control of his country he wouldn't forget how quickly the IC abandoned him. From Qaddafi's point of view there would no longer be any incentive for him not to support (and conduct) terrorism, to pursue WMDs, to completely renationalize Libya's oil, to return to a harsh position against Israel, etc. In other words, Qaddafi's foreign policy would once again become troublesome, if not more so. Of course, the ostensible reason the IC decided to militarily intervene in the Libyan civil war is because of a human rights issue, namely, Qaddafi's brutal crackdown of protesters (clearly they weren't going to secure a UN resolution otherwise hence the requisite human rights language). But I don't believe it's the real reason. Though it was denied again and again, even by President Obama, the goal has always been regime change. Because again, I think they realized their folly and in order to ensure Qaddafi wouldn't return to power and once again become a menace to them the IC decided to intervene in the conflict. To sum up, the fear of a return of a Pre-Lockerbie Bombing Qaddafi is the principal reason why the IC wants Qaddafi gone and not because he was in violation of the UN's human rights charter.

Don't get me wrong. It will be just fine by me if Qaddafi is removed from power. Nevertheless, I think this was a classic case in which the global community did not thoroughly consider its options before hand. The reality now is that Libya may be getting a new government. Most are hopeful that it will be a democratic one but given how little we know about the groups involved in the rebellion (in fact early intelligence indicated that some of the members were affiliated with Al Qaeda) there's no way to predict the future of a post-Qaddafi Libya. I for one am pessimistic that it will turn out in such a manner as the IC, especially the West, hopes.

Top Ten Foreign Policy Presidents: Part II

And now the conclusion....


5.) James Polk: Another polarizing figure since many perceive him to be entirely culpable for igniting the Mexican-American War. Though this is true to some degree that war's origins are more complicated with Mexico bearing much of the blame as well. Nevertheless, you don't have the the SW territories (mostly due to the aforementioned war) or the Oregon Territory without the clever diplomacy of Polk, especially concerning the latter since Polk was constantly having to work around the schemes of his Secretary of State James Buchanan who at every turn attempted to subvert Polk's foreign policy objectives.

4.) Theodore Roosevelt: TR not only originated the saying "speak softly and carry a big stick" but embodied it as well. Among his many foreign policy achievements: a closer alignment with Britain (the US/British relationship had become significantly stagnated over the years); sending the Great White Fleet around the world in order to display the Naval might of the United States, being the force behind the building of the Panama Canal, and earning a Nobel Peace Prize for mediating an end to the 1905 Russo-Japanese war.

3.) Thomas Jefferson: During a time when Europe was being turned upside down by Napoleon, Jefferson deftly managed the foreign relations of the United States, especially tempering his prior Francophilia to maintain a healthy balance between US interests with France and Great Britain and carefully keeping the country out of their conflict but also taking advantage of it by purchasing, at an amazingly cheap price, the Louisiana Territory (Napoleon was in dire need of funds to keep his campaigns going) which made way for the successful Lewis and Clark expedition. Also, Jefferson achieved victory in the Barbary Wars chiefly by intensifying the construction of the US Navy (started by his predecessor John Adams during the Quasi War with France) that ultimately proved requisite for our "success" against the Royal Navy during the War of 1812.

2.) James Monroe (John Quincy Adams): The Monroe Doctrine was a watershed moment in the history of the foreign policy of the United States. It essentially stated that any attempts by the European powers to intervene in the affairs of the countries in the Western Hemisphere (meaning chiefly Latin America) would be viewed as an act of aggression. This astute move by Monroe was pivotal in ensuring two things that were essential for the future growth of the United States: economic advantage and national security. (I'm cheating here a bit by including John Quincy Adams with Monroe but the fact of the matter is that Adams deserves much of the credit for the Monroe Doctrine because he was one of its chief architects.)

1.) Franklin Delano Roosevelt: There should be no surprise here. Though not personally a fan of FDR I cannot doubt that at a time when the American populace was fiercely isolationist it is admirable how ingeniously FDR involved the US in WWII (thus it is no surprise that many conspiracy theories developed so quickly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor that suggested FDR either knew about the attack ahead of time or, more maliciously, orchestrated it himself). He achieved this by implementing such policies as the Lend-Lease Act which significantly aided Britain while the US was still "officially" not a participant in the war. I don't think any other President would have been able to juggle American isolationism with the pressing need to become more involved on the world stage. And for that FDR gets the top spot on my list.

Well, that's that. My top ten...for what it's worth. I know that many will disagree with some of my choices but at least it succeeds in being a much more comprehensive list than most I've seen. In summary, here's the complete list:

10.) George Washington

9.) Richard Nixon

8.) Abraham Lincoln

7.) Harry S. Truman

6.) George H.W. Bush

5.) James Polk

4.) Theodore Roosevelt

3.) Thomas Jefferson

2.) James Monroe (w/ John Quincy Adams)

1.) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Top Ten Foreign Policy Presidents: Part I

Recently, Dr. Daniel Drezner of Foreign Policy.com cited a study done by The Atlantic in which Michael Cohen gave his list of the "Best and Worst Foreign Policy Presidents". When I read it I realized that the only Presidents listed were from the 20th Century (and none before Woodrow Wilson) which perturbed me greatly. Time to time I've seen this before where foreign policy analysts, academics, journalists, etc tend to ignore completely the foreign policy achievements/failures of Presidents prior to Wilson. Indeed, the standard narrative continues to be that for the end of the 18th century and through the 19th the United States was happily isolationist, concerned only with focusing on its own internal affairs and building itself into a proper nation until the occurrence of the "hinge" event, namely, the Spanish-American War. According to this narrative, it's this conflict with Spain that begins to turn America's interests towards quasi-imperial musings which then become intensified (and to a degree ratified) with Woodrow Wilson and the US entrance into World War I. So then in this standard narrative the United States doesn't really begin to conduct a robust foreign policy until the 20th century, particularly until Woodrow Wilson.

This is a very myopic take on the history of American foreign policy. Yes, of course the 20th century witnessed two World Wars and one cold one. But this doesn't mean that the 18th and 19th centuries were any less significant in terms of the impact of geopolitics on the United States. So to remedy the situation I offer my own, much more comprehensive top ten list of the best foreign policy Presidents with brief explanations:

Note: these aren't necessarily in any particular order of importance.

10.) George Washington: During a very vulnerable phase in the history of the United States Washington was able to keep the foreign policy of the newly formed Republic restrained, maintaining a healthy balance between France, its most recent ally, and Britain, its most recent foe. Furthermore, in his famous Farewell Address Washington exhorted the young country not to forge "entangling alliances" with the countries of Europe because he understood that a country as newborn as itself couldn't realistically maintain such alliances and would probably find itself quickly snuffed out from history if it did so.

9.) Richard Nixon: I know this one is going to raise many eyebrows but the fact remains that no matter how detestable Nixon's domestic politics were he was (with of course the aid of Henry Kissinger) a master at crafting foreign policy. His policy of Russian detente and rapprochement with Communist China are the most notable of his achievements though they are often, along with his Vietnam policy, heavily criticized. But the fact of the matter is that a policy of detente with the Russians and an opening with China were the right policies to pursue during a decade when the United States' prestige and power was at its nadir.

8.) Abraham Lincoln: Because of the massive importance of the Civil War, Lincoln's foreign policy often gets overlooked. In fact, of the tens of thousands of books that have been written about Lincoln and the Civil War I'm not aware of one that devotes itself to studying Lincoln's foreign policy (though I'm sure at least one must exist). But the fact of the matter is that Lincoln (along with his Secretary of State William Seward) had to tread very carefully in terms of his diplomacy with the European countries, especially Britain who at one point strongly considered backing the Confederates because at the time they were importing most of their cotton from the South. But Lincoln was able to keep Britain and other countries from intervening in the Civil War; in my mind a major foreign policy achievement.

7.) Harry S. Truman: Truman tends to be a rather polarizing figure among foreign policy buffs; many detest his policies and blame him for "starting" the Cold War while others fulsomely praise his approach to foreign affairs. I tend towards the latter, minus the fulsome praise. I think Truman was a very good foreign policy president especially when you consider that he was thrust into the role of world statesman upon the sudden death of FDR when, by his own admission, he had no prior foreign policy experience. Truman had to preside over the end of WW II, the beginnings of the Cold War, European reconstruction, the Berlin crisis, the creation of Israel, and many others. Of course he had his failures, among which I would include some of his miscues during the Korean War, but overall I believe Truman handled the foreign policy load that was abruptly heaped upon him with diplomatic finesse.

6.) George H.W. Bush: I was a little hesitant to put George Sr on here because I have many problems with his approach to the Gulf War but his overseeing of the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union was handled with diplomatic care and for this very simple but major reason I include him on the list.

To be continued with the final five next week, of the list that is and not the final five Cylons.

The Chicken or the....Dinosaur???

I was about to turn 11 when I saw Jurassic Park for the first time. The experience is something that I vividly remember because I had always had a fascination with dinosaurs. In fact, my brother and I's room was typically scattered with all kinds of toys, many of which were dinosaurs of one sort or another, especially of the Tyrannosaurus Rex. And the earliest books that I recall reading were books about dinosaurs. Supposedly, according to many members of my family, my brother and I were experts often having to correct others on their mistaken identification of some dinosaur species. In addition, I watched as many movies and TV shows that I could at the time about dinosaurs. So naturally when I heard about Spielberg making a dinosaur movie called Jurassic Park I begged my mother to take us to opening night which she graciously did. I was of course awe struck by the entire film but specifically I remember being fascinated by Dr. Grant's implication early in the film that birds evolved from dinosaurs as well as the short discussion he had with Timmy about a book he wrote on the same topic. Now of course I didn't really have any idea what evolution was or how it worked then; nevertheless the mere suggestion that some dinosaurs became modern day birds captivated me.

The theory that birds originated from dinosaurs isn't all that novel having been proposed as far back as 1861 upon the discovery of Archaeopteryx, a winged and feathered dinosaur. However, it took time for the theory to gain any traction, partly because of the intense controversy it engendered among evolutionary biologists. But the hard to deny vast similarities between the bones of some dinosaurs (such as the Velociraptor) and that of modern day birds, the discovery of many more fossils linking the two such as the Chinese feathered dinosaurs, and advances in modern genetics has persuaded most of the viability of the theory. It's especially the advances in genetics that has convinced most. Amazingly, what geneticists are able to do today, while a chicken and/or bird is an embryo, is reactivate some of its atavistic genes to give it teeth, remove its feathers, and even grow it a tail among other modifications. (Note that this isn't just convincing proof that birds evolved from dinosaurs; it's compelling, indeed conclusive, evidence for the theory of evolution itself). I had stumbled upon this some time ago while watching a program on the Discovery Channel but had forgotten about it until I recently watched a TED video presented by famed paleontologist Jack Horner (who was actually partly the inspiration for the character of Alan Grant in Jurassic Park). I am thus compelled to share this video which does a good job summarizing the gains geneticists have made in "retro-engineering" a dinosaur from a chicken. Enjoy.

(For the impatient lot of you I would suggest starting at about 10 mins into the presentation.)

The Philosophy of "3:10 to Yuma" (Warning: Spoilers!)

One of my favorite Westerns, as well as one of my favorite movies in general, is 3:10 to Yuma, i.e., the remake with Christian Bale and Russell Crowe (the original was made in 1957 which itself was adapted from a short story of the same name). It's a rather straightforward moral tale in which Dan Evans ( Bale), a one-legged Civil War veteran turned rancher agrees to help escort the notorious outlaw Ben Wade (Crowe) to the town of Contention in order to put him on the 3:10 train to Yuma prison all while trying to stay one step ahead of Wade's trailing gang. Along the way the group encounters many obstacles including their prisoner Ben Wade killing off some of their members but in the end Wade actually turns face and helps Evans put himself on the train as well as killing off his own gang after Charlie Prince (played brilliantly by Ben Foster) guns down Evans.

And any time that I hear that one of my friends hasn't seen the movie I'll promptly, unilaterally, clear their schedule so that the situation can be remedied as quickly as possible. I recently had to do this with a fellow co-worker. In fact, I've done this so many times now that it has effectively become an informal social experiment. The result? Well, it's strikingly right down the middle: half really like it, half really don't. For those who don't like the movie it comes down to one thing: Ben Wade's turn from the dark side; "Why would he do that; he's the villain, it doesn't make any sense for him to help Dan, kill his entire gang, and willingly get on the train!" are their typically exasperated replies. Furthermore, this revolt is usually ironclad for when I try to point out that Wade's volte face is actually consistent with the rest of the story (throughout the movie hints are dropped that Ben Wade isn't all bad even at one point having Dan's son, William, explicity suggest such) they refuse to budge from their entrenched position of incredulity at the film's turn of events.

But what is more fascinating to me is what most tend to say next, namely, that in "real life" Ben Wade would not have acted in such a righteous fashion, never mind the fact that most film is inherently otherworldly and so not intended as an authentic representation of reality. This is intriguing to me because of what these remonstrations and outcries suggest about the philosophical worldview of these viewers, namely, that they believe our natures are immutably fixed, that people don't really have the capacity to change. This is of course a strongly fatalistic notion and if you were to mention this to these viewers they might argue otherwise, maybe even vehemently so. I'm just surprised at the number of people predisposed towards a predestinarian/fatalistic view of reality who are not aware of such.

Because I've become progressively more cynical over the years I would have thought that by now I would have found such a strict fatalistic worldview appealing. And I suppose I do to some degree but the truth is, whether due to an atavistic trait leftover from my former pious Christian days or some other intangible reason, I still cling to the hope that people do have the ability to change their natures, though extremely difficult it may be. Moreover, I've always been fond of the redemption motif in film and literature which is essentially what changing from "bad" to "good" is all about. Indeed, most of my favorite movies contain a redemption theme to one degree or another, especially probably my all time favorite movie, Star Wars, which isn't really about Luke Skywalker as some mistakenly think but is rather about the ultimate redemption of his father, Anakin Skywalker.

I guess the bottom line is that no matter how cynical I become I'll probably never give up on the, perhaps futile, hope that people can change, that they can be redeemed. And for this reason I am moved every time by Ben Wade's actions at the end of the film. Thus, I'm happy to continue to claim 3:10 to Yuma as one of my all time favorite movies.

Discere Gratiā Discendī

I realize there has been quite another lapse in blog entries, partly because I got a new job that has been keeping me quite busy, partly because I had to get moved into my new place, and partly, if not mostly, because of pure sloth. Anyways, I'm going to try to remedy the situation by blogging more often. And by that I mean committing to posting at least one blog entry a week.

Now that housekeeping matters have been taken care of I want to briefly discuss public education reform, a matter of which I've always been particularly passionate about. But it had been a while since I had actually thought about the variegated and controversial issues surrounding public education until I recently had a chance to watch David Guggenheim's documentary entitled Waiting for "Superman". It's a searing and disheartening look at the state of public education in the United States and the many factors that continually stymy attempts at genuine reform of the system such as the inequity that exists in terms of access to good schools, the near impossibility of firing bad teachers because of a well entrenched tenure system, staunch opposition from teacher's unions, the lack of uniformity in regulations across state and county lines, and more. In addition to explicating these roadblocks to PE reform the documentary also attempts to elucidate some potential solutions to the problem such as arguing for the creation of more charter schools. (Note that it is on the subject of charter schools where the documentary is least persuasive because it appears to have exaggerated some of its statistics concerning comparisons of rates of success with other schools. See this article for more.)

While I agreed with much the documentary had to say about PE I was disappointed that it didn't address the more fundamental, philosophical problems that have become systemic in our education system. What I'm thinking of particularly here is the failure to inculcate within our children at a young age the desire to learn for learning's sake, i.e., to think of acquiring knowledge as an end in itself instead of as a means towards an altogether different end. I propose that if we could at least modestly achieve such there would be better disciplined, better performing children in schools.

The problem though is that our society has always valued pragmatism over idealism, utility over abstraction (much of which is due to our philosophical inheritance but just as much to our history of characteristic rugged individualism). This bias then permeated our public education system with the reforms of the pragmatist philosopher and psychologist John Dewey during the early 20th century. Those of you who have studied or gotten your degree in the Humanities encounter this bias of utility all the time: "Oh, you're getting your degree in English. Well, what can you do with that?" We instinctively regard doctors, lawyers, scientists, and others with higher esteem than other professions because their contributions to society are more readily apparent. Now don't misunderstand I'm not trying to disparage this well ensconced American tradition but in my opinion it's precisely this exaggerated emphasis on the value of function that I think prevents us from seeing the value that can come from loving knowledge for knowledge's sake.

Again, I strongly believe that if you can instill within a child at a young age the desire to learn as an end in itself and more importantly, to love knowledge, then I think you can create a much larger group of children who are going to perform admirably both in school and society. Of course, I realize that without the reforms mentioned in the above documentary this proposal would not on its own fix the many problems in our public education system. Nevertheless, I think addressing the underlying philosophical problems is a must and this is something that the documentary fails to do.

So how do you plant the desire to learn for learning's sake within children at a young age? I admit that I'm less certain as to specifics here. But for my part I didn't start appreciating learning as an end in itself until I enrolled in an introductory philosophy course in my first year of college and I can certainly say that I was a better student all around afterwards for it. Now I'm not suggesting that we start having kindergartners read Descartes Discourse on Method in the original Latin and then submit their proposed solutions to the mind/body problem but I do think there may be a way one can present certain ideas within philosophy in a comprehensible way to young kids.

Another idea may be to resurrect the classical learning tradition where kids get a good dose of Latin, Greek, Ancient History and Literature, Logic, and others in addition to the more "practical" forms of learning such as math and science. There are some private schools that have begun to adopt this method but those have a strong Christian element which is obviously not something I'm advocating for public schools. Again, these are just some random ideas of mine that may or may not have any merit.

Regardless, it is clear that our public education system is in severe disrepair and, not withstanding its flaws, Guggenheim's documentary does well in presenting this unfortunate fact to the public. Do watch.

The Geopolitics of Zombies

The last several years have seen a remarkable resurgence in popularity of the zombie genre. No longer a feature exclusive to horror films zombies now infest a range of pop culture media. They are a staple of video games (the Resident Evil games being perhaps the best example), revisionist classic literature (Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, e.g.), comic book spinoffs (Marvel Zombies), survival manuals for possible zombie outbreaks (Max Brooks' The Zombie Survival Guide), TV (AMC's The Walking Dead, based on the Robert Kirkman graphic novels which I devoured in Afghanistan), and more. And in recognition of this surge in zombie interest May has been designated Zombie Awareness month by the Zombie Research Society. I thus feel compelled to post something on the topic before the month is out. Hence, this zombie infested post.

Now generally within the zombie corpus the focus tends to be centered around a group (or groups) of people and their singular attempts at survival and the impact this has on their humanity (the classic example being George Romero's Night of the Living Dead). Rarely, is there an attempt to exhibit how modern nation states would initially react to a zombie outbreak and the subsequent policies they might initiate to counter such a threat (a delightfully notable exception to this is Max Brooks' World War Z which displays a surprisingly good grasp of current world politics). And so it was a pleasant surprise when I stumbled upon Dr. Daniel Drezner's website (he also has a great blog) where I learned that he had written a monograph on just such a topic entitled, quite appropriately, Theories of International Politics and Zombies.

The book is of course written tongue in cheek, but Drezner approaches the subject from an academic standpoint even doing such scholarly things as first engaging with the relevant zombie literature and devoting a chapter to defining the boundaries of what constitutes a true zombie (in other words bringing clarity to the topic, something which every scholar must do before proceeding with the subject that they are treating). The principal thrust of the work is to examine how traditional International Relations concepts would treat a zombie apocalypse. For example, during a discussion about realpolitik Drezner theorizes that states that operate from this IR framework would essentially view a zombie outbreak as no different than plagues of the past. Therefore, they wouldn't perceive any real change in the international order and would continue to act as they typically do, i.e., based on their perceived national security interests. They would thus be disinclined towards doing such things as forming grand alliances with other states to tackle a zombie infestation especially if they believed it would be against their own self-interests to do so.

In fact, Drezner further speculates that it is quite likely some nations would manipulate a zombie outbreak to their advantage by using it as a means of achieving long sought after geopolitical objectives (e.g., China might accuse Taiwan of failing to control their zombie infestation using this as an excuse to then occupy the island thus cementing their historic desire of uniting Taiwan with the mainland). In contrast, a country that operates within a liberalist IR worldview would more likely perceive a zombie outbreak as a uniquely global threat to the international world order and so would seek to create a United Nations like organization to combat the world menace. However, a likely consequence of the liberal position would be the development of distracting debates about zombie rights which could then undermine any unified alliance against a zombie outbreak. In addition to realism and liberalism, Drezner also engages with other lesser known IR theories but I don't want to spoil the rest of the book so if your interest has been piqued by this post then buy his book now!

In short, it is a very enjoyable work being both a source of entertainment as well as an ingenious means of teaching basic IR theories to the uninitiated. It is a fun and pleasant addition to our ever increasing fascination with all things zombies. Alright, that's my meager contribution for Zombie Awareness Month. I'll close by leaving you with a scene from one of my favorite zombie spoof movies, Sean of the Dead. Enjoy.

http://youtu.be/kKTf7CqQi8g

My Meeting at Vanderbilt

Some of you know that I've been looking to go back to graduate school (but for history this time) and last week I took my first crucial step in this process by meeting up with Dr. Thomas Schwartz at Vanderbilt University. Vanderbilt is one of my top choices but being one of the southern "Ivy League" schools it is very difficult to get into (of 300 applicants last year only 8 were accepted into the Phd program), particularly for me since my undergraduate work was not in history. I've known that this is the biggest barrier that I'm going to face even though the programs I'm looking into don't require an applicant to have a BA in history in order to be considered for acceptance. But as Dr. Schwartz pointed out when it comes to getting into Phd programs having a solid background in history in your undergraduate work is usually a must because of how competitive these programs are.

Moreover, because there is a strong possibility that I could be deployed again within the next few years, Dr. Schwartz noted that even though by law they would have to hold my place in the program they are not required to pause my funding. In other words, I would lose a year of funding. And so because of these factors Dr. Schwartz suggested that the best approach might be to restrict my applications to terminal masters degree programs because requirements for admission aren't as strict, and I can of course gain significant experience in history with a MA which will then help me considerably when I later apply for Phd programs.

But besides advising me tactically about graduate school we discussed some of his work, especially concerning his work on Lyndon Johnson's foreign policy towards Europe (he published a book on the topic entitled Lyndon B. Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam) and his upcoming intellectual biography of Henry Kissinger, a topic of which I am very interested. I was delighted to learn that we share very similar views about Kissinger's role during the Vietnam War. In fact at the end of our meeting he gave me a copy of an essay about Kissinger that he had published in the British diplomatic history journal Diplomacy and Statecraft.

As much as I wanted to learn about Dr. Schwartz' past, present, and future scholarly activities he was just as eager to hear about my experiences in Afghanistan; specifically he wanted to gauge my views, i.e. a soldier's views, about the war there and my feelings about US policy in the region. And it was during my rant about how I had qualms about calling the conflict in Afghanistan a war since by traditional definitions the war came to a conclusion with the toppling of the Taliban (because that was the official, stated objective of the war) that Dr. Schwartz made a good point about the celebrations surrounding the death of Bin Laden (I had complained that some characteristics of the celebrations were silly and excessive) which was that since WWII and the signing of the official surrender of the Japanese empire on the U.S.S. Missouri Americans haven't had that kind of clear symbol of victory to produce such elation. The killing of Bin Laden has been the nearest thing to this which is why the reaction has been so strong, even farcical in some areas (the singing of 'nah, nah, nah, nah....hey, hey...goodbye' comes to mind).

Anyways, the meeting went well and was very beneficial. I will continue to update on here from time to time my progress in attempting to get back into graduate school.

Some Older Thoughts about V-E Day

Two days ago marked the anniversary of V-E Day. Usually I try to write something at least peripherally about WWII on that day. However, I've just been caught up in too many things lately so I'm going to be a bit lazy and post something I wrote in my journal a couple of years ago about V-E Day. Bear in mind this is from my journal and thus is not as analytical as what you may have become accustomed to on this blog. I have made some minor revisions (such as updating the year, smoothing out some of the grammar, correction of spelling errors, and dropping the sordid details from the orgy of the previous night) and inserted a few editorial comments for clarification of some ideas and words (noted by the black lettering).


Today marks sixty-six years since the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the official end of the European theater of conflict in WWII (it is the "official" end because the actual act of surrender from the German COs [Hitler committed suicide on April 25th] was proffered on the 7th of May but for geopolitical reasons Stalin insisted that the declaration be made on the following day). And so the official day that the German high command surrendered has become known as V-E Day or Victory in Europe Day. There is a particularly iconic image that represents much of the elation felt that day in which a sailor (spontaneously?) passionately embraces and kisses a nurse upon hearing the news.


Unfortunately, these ebullient feelings would be of short duration as the full extent of Axis' atrocities became revealed, particularly the horrors perpetrated by Hitler's Nazi Germany. This calls to mind one of my favorite episodes of Band of Brothers entitled "Why We Fight" which occurs during the events shortly after V-E Day. As the title of the episode indicates the soldiers start questioning why they have been involved in a war that seemed to be all about the affairs of countries other than their own; it is difficult for them to understand why they should be concerned with European geopolitics and its consequences/effects on the national security of the United States. And though they never quite resolve these political issues they are finally able to embrace a moral justification for the war when they stumble upon their first Jewish concentration camp and are given an answer to why they fight. Now though most nations knew fully well by at least 1942 about Hitler's attempts to exterminate the Jews (and other undesirables) with the purpose of making Europe Judenrein (free of Jews) most of the soldiers were unaware of these malevolent crimes against humanity until they began to liberate the concentration camps.

But as tragic as WWII was it is remarkable in that, to my mind at least, it is the one conflict of recent times that is difficult, perhaps impossible, to assert should never have happened. Of course there is a sense in which one could argue that no war should ever happen and I concede such. But after the appeasement at Munich in 1938 (and I would argue long before) the world was justified to stop Hitler by force. (Though there are fringe revisionist scholars who try to make the specious argument that WWII was not justified in any sense they remain so marginal that their effects on people's judgment about WWII is, thankfully, negligible. But that hasn't keep some from continuing to try and argue such. For example, see my series of posts about Pat Buchanan's view of the war starting here.) All other conflicts of recent time (Iraq I and II, Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, etc) that the US has been directly involved in do not fare as well under the same kind of moral scrutiny.

Of course the truth of the matter is that the US did not get involved in WWII for any strictly moral reason (exemplified by the fact that it took nearly three years for the US to get into the war and when Roosevelt refused to do such morally 'necessary' actions as diverting bomber resources to destroy the various railroad networks that transported Jews and others to the gas chambers) but principally for geopolitical/national security reasons. In fact, this is ultimately why any nation state goes to war: security. And regardless of the new vogue ideas that arise in the field of International Relations, and the continuing utterance of platitudes that occur during meaningless discussions about 'idealism (or liberalism)' versus 'realism' the fact of the matter is that a nation state will be chiefly compelled to war when it perceives a threat to its own security (I am using 'security' here as a blanket designation covering the sum total of a country's national self-interests). Yet as much as I would like to believe that the US entered WWII because it felt morally compelled to do so the reality is that it did not get involved until its own national security was threatened, namely, by the bombing of Pearl Harbor (To be fair the reluctance to enter WWII did not originate from Roosevelt but rather from the very much ingrained isolationist thinking of the American populace). Nevertheless, the world is of course better off because the US did eventually enter the war ultimately turning the tide against Hitler and Nazi Germany bringing about the end of the European conflict of WWII on this day, Victory in Europe Day.

Rambling Thoughts on Bin Laden and Pakistan

Well, after nearly ten years the mastermind of 9/11 Usama Bin Laden was finally killed by a Navy Seals team during a raid on a compound in Pakistan. This is of course a great victory for the US and the war on terrorism. Yet I think that its importance is probably more symbolic than anything else. Yes, Bin Laden was the official head of Al Qaeda but like most terrorist groups Al Qaeda lacks a rigid hierarchial structure being largely a collection of loose affiliations and so unfortunately it will probably be able to function just fine without Bin Laden. Nonetheless, on balance I think the world is much safer and better off without him.

However, what's of more interest to me about the situation is the role of Pakistan in all of this. Now it strains credulity to think that Pakistan had no knowledge that Bin Laden was hiding in their country especially when it turned out to be a city crawling with Pakistani Army regulars and more importantly the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency. Of course when you consider the role Islamabad has played during the war in Afghanistan this isn't too terribly surprising. Since the beginning of the war on terrorism Pakistan has made Bismark proud by playing both sides off one another, namely, on the one hand aiding the US by providing significant overflight of their territory, capturing some insurgents, and providing intel on others but on the other hand covertly aiding some of the insurgents and providing them a safe haven just inside their borders. (The unit that I was with in Afghanistan saw this up close when they were in the east where they would constantly be shot but could never pursue because the insurgents would ease right back into Pakistan. Also Pakistan's Janus face role has been known since the start of the war which is why the wikileaks fiasco didn't really reveal anything that wasn't already known about US-Pakistani relations before.)

On the surface this duplicitous action makes no sense: wouldn't Pakistan benefit from a strong, stable Afghanistan? Well, that's actually precisely what Pakistan does not want. To understand why you have to look at Pakistan's own security interests and concerns. One of these is the fact that Pakistan has a large Islamic fundamentalist demographic in its country that it wishes to keep subdued but the one that determines the direction of just about all of Pakistan's national security interests is centered on Islamabad's obsession with its mortal enemy India. Ever since the violent partition of British India in 1947 resulted in the formation of these states they have fought numerous military conflicts mostly over the region of Kashmir, even coming close to nuclear war a couple of times. One war (1971) even led to the formation of a new state, Bangladesh. (go here for more).

And the way that Afghanistan figures into the equation is because during the period between WWII and the Soviet invasion when they were relatively stable they quarreled with Pakistan over the Durand line (the artificial and somewhat arbitrary border composed by Great Britain during the Great Game against Russia in the 19th century which the Afghans do not recognize but which Pakistan does) and over the Pashtunistan and Balochistan issues (acquiring territory from the latter region would give Afghanistan access to a long sought after warm water port). Moreover, as a means of agitating Pakistan and strengthening their own hand Afghanistan increased its ties to India maintaining a strong and healthy relationship for sometime up until the Afghan Civil War (the Taliban when they gained control of most of the country promptly cut most ties with India and strengthened relations with Pakistan).

In short, Pakistan for several decades felt encircled by hostile powers and as any good student of international relations knows if a country feels it's surrounded by aggressive powers it will take whatever steps it deems necessary to relieve itself of feeling threatened. Thus, Pakistan has a major interest in maintaining the status quo in Afghanistan, i.e., keeping the country weak and wobbly so that it continues to remain focused on domestic issues like the insurgency. But at the same time it obviously doesn't want a failed state on its border and so the double game: supporting the US efforts just enough to keep Afghanistan from completely failing but aiding elements of the insurgency as well to keep Afghanistan weak and principally focused on its internal security situation. One thing Pakistan cannot abide is a strong Afghanistan for fear that it will one day again ally itself closely with India.

The events surrounding the death of Bin Laden continue to bear this out and it is no surprise that Pakistan most likely knew that Bin Laden was hiding out in their country. All of this just emphasizes how crucial resolving the Pakistan problem is to a comprehensive and successful solution to the war in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the US has gained an important symbolic victory with the death of Usama Bin Laden (and kudos to President Obama by the way; give credit where credit is due). And with that I've rambled on enough. I leave you with a song that paradoxically (because it's European) expresses my patriotic feelings at the moment:

God, Evolution, and...the Clitoris? Or "An Inquiry into the Evolution of the Female Orgasm"

A few times now I've mentioned my new found interest in biological evolution, particularly human evolution. This doesn't mean, however, that I've become an atheist which many believe (including both theologians and prominent evolutionary biologists) is requisite for belief in evolution, at least human evolution. No, I remain a theist and I don't believe these positions are mutually exclusive. But I just as strongly do not think any version(s) of "intelligent design" or ID should become a regular part of any public school's science curriculum (which is sadly where my State appears to be headed).

Nevertheless, in a sort of half jest I've pointed out to some of my ID friends that there are certain oddities with human physiology that appear to defy satisfactory explanation from an evolutionary perspective, thus perhaps directly pointing to an intelligent designer. My favorite one to reference is the clitoris: the seat of female orgasm. Now since time immemorial women have known that the chief area of stimulation for them to reach orgasm lies at/in their clitoris (unfortunately some men come upon this revelation much too late to the chagrin of their female mates). And though some women can achieve orgasm through vaginal intercourse most can only do so through direct or at least indirect stimulation of the clitoris. Furthermore, many studies have borne this out over the last half century or so. (Since I'm sure the majority of women can personally attest to what I've just said it may seem a bit odd that I'm about to back my claims with some scientific studies but hey I'm trying to be as academic about this topic as possible.)

There are three in particular worth mentioning briefly here. First, there was the Kinsey report of 1953, one of the first academic studies (aside from some of the eccentric studies done by Freud) dealing with human sexuality. In the volume released that dealt with female sexuality it reported that out of a sample of 8,000 women only about 15 percent could reach orgasm through means other than clitoral stimulation whether during masturbation and/or sexual intercourse. Likewise, Masters and Johnson's book of 1966 had similar results in its study and concluded that "female orgasms are identical in physiology and clitoral in origin." And lastly The Hite Report of 1976 found that out of a sample of 3,000 women less than 25 percent could reach orgasm without at least indirect stimulation of the clitoris leading Shere Hite to conclude that "not to have orgasm from intercourse is the experience of the majority of women."

But what bearing does any of this have on evolution and intelligent design? Well, if one assumes that evolution occurs because of the utility of a newly evolved trait (and its subsequent replication in a species) then the existence of the clitoris seems problematic for the theory of evolution. To make sense of this argument let's consider the reproductive organ of males: the penis. The evolution of the penis makes sense because the peak of sexual excitement in a male occurs during ejaculation which of course usually takes place during vaginal intercourse that then leads (usually) to the further propagation of the species. In other words on an evolutionary account the appearance and development of the penis makes perfect sense because of the immediate and direct function it has in promoting the continuation of a species. However, the same cannot be said for the clitoris because it doesn't appear to perform any direct function in the reproduction of the species. Another way to think about this is that one would expect the interior of the vagina to be the primary site of female orgasm because that is the site of reproduction but as mentioned above it clearly isn't. To the contrary, the clitoris is decidedly away from the primary site for reproduction. In a nutshell, the existence of the clitoris is difficult to explain on the basis of evolutionary theory because it doesn't appear to have a basis in utility. Thus, the origin of my half jest that all one need do is point to the clitoris as proof of God's existence.

Of course when you think you've hit upon an original insight it is almost always the case that someone else had already done so long before you did. And that was the case here because a couple of weeks ago I stumbled upon this very issue in an essay by the late paleo-biologist Stephen Jay Gould entitled "Male Nipples and Clitoral Ripples" (it can be found in a collection of natural history essays by Gould in Bully for Brontosaurus). In this essay he deals with the difficulty in explaining male nipples and, for our purposes, the clitoris in terms of evolution. (For those curious about male nipples I would encourage you to read the essay though as you will see in a moment the solution to this puzzle is the same for both) And to my surprise he offers what I think is a very satisfactory account for the evolution of the clitoris.

But before revealing this explanation it's best to point out a misunderstanding (or perhaps, better, incomplete understanding) many have about how evolution works (this included me until reading Gould's essay). This "incomplete" grasp of evolution has to do with what I stated above, namely, the belief that a trait/characteristic evolves solely because it performs some sort of direct function for a species. In other words, the explanation for why a certain trait/characteristic evolved and developed must necessarily be for an adaptive purpose. Or as Gould puts it, "many are committed to a 'pop' form of Darwinianism that adopts a principle of pervasive utility for all parts of all creatures." (126)

However, as Gould notes a proper, holistic grasp of evolutionary theory holds that traits in an organism can also evolve for "structural nonadaptive" reasons, i.e, evolution may produce a structure in an organism that at least initially doesn't serve any purpose. And as Gould emphasizes in his essay modern evolutionary theory operates from a synthesis of both functional and structural perspectives.

With this in mind the explanation for the evolution of the clitoris is actually rather simple and has to do with a structure produced by evolution, namely, the human embryo. Perhaps it's best to just let Gould elaborate at this point:

"Both sexes are variants upon a single ground plan, elaborated in later embryology...the external differences between male and female develop gradually from an early embryo so generalized that its sex cannot be easily determined. The clitoris and the penis are one and the same organ, identical in early form, but later enlarged in male fetuses through the action of testosterone." (127)

Thus:

"The reason for a clitoral site of orgasm is simple...the clitoris is the homologue of the penis-it is the same organ, endowed with the same anatomical organization and capacity of response." (129)

So then the clitoris and the penis are homologous structures and it is through subsequent sexual differentiation that the reproductive organs of the respective sexes appear; evolution having produced this structure or "ground plan" in the human organism. And there you have it: a satisfactory, evolutionary account of the origins of the clitoris. Sorry ID friends but I'm afraid that the clitoris is no longer proof that God exists.

*Note: the solution for male nipples is the same: the result of sexual differentiation from homologous structures. Also, Gould does note a few who actually try to account for the evolution of the clitoris from a purely adaptive perspective (e.g., as a means of pair bonding). He also takes on some of the ridiculous arguments of Freud concerning human female sexuality. For those interested I would encourage you to read the entire essay.

A Promise Broken and Another Promise Made

Well, unfortunately I'm going to have to break my promise on blogging about Libya. Even after having read those few books I still don't feel informed enough to write a scholarly post about Libya and Qaddafi so I'm going to delay writing about the current events happening there until I've read more. However, I do have a post pretty much ready to be put up but because I'm going to be out of town this Easter weekend I'm not going to post it until Monday.

I decided to have some fun with the upcoming post since it will be my first substantial one since returning from Afghanistan. Plus, I've noticed that one of my most popular posts continues to be the masturbation and Seinfeld one because, I assume, of its sexual content. I therefore took advantage of the fact that sex still sells in composing the next post. However, since it is Good Friday I do want to leave you with something I wrote many years ago about the difficulty in determining when the historical Jesus actually died and its implications for biblical inerrancy. Beware though it is a bit lengthy. Here are the links. Enjoy.

1.) Introduction
2.) Part 1
3.) Part 2
4.) Part 3
5.) Excursus
6.) Part 4
7.) Part 5
8.) Conclusion

Still Here And Apologies

I don't know that it matters a whole lot that I've not been blogging since most of my readership originates from Facebook; nevertheless apologies to those who do take the time to read this blog. I've been itching to blog about the events going on in Libya because I certainly have my opinions about the situation there. However, I decided to refrain from doing so for the moment because I wanted to better inform myself of the history of the geopolitics in that region which is what I have been doing by reading several books on the subject. Hopefully, I should be finished with the last two books that I need to read about the history of Libyan foreign policy in the next several days and so once this is done I will finally feel somewhat qualified to blog about the ongoing events there and thus, finally, have a new post up. So for those who have been eagerly awaiting a new blog post I give my apologies once again and promise to do my utmost to finally have a post up by week's end. Until then for those interested here's what I've been reading to prepare:

Libya: From Colony to Independence (2008); Ronald Bruce St John

Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969-1987 (2001); Ronald Bruce St. John

Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack on Libya (1990); Brian L. Davis

Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801-1805 (2004); Joseph Wheelan

Redeployment Complete

Well, I have safely made it back to the States. Thanks to all of you who have already welcomed me back. Unfortunately, because of the demands on my time from family and friends and the fact that I as of yet don't have regular access to the internet it may still be several days before I start posting again. So please be patient with me. But at least we are together again which gives me yet another reason to post a Muppet's video. Enjoy.